Apes, Language, and the Human Mind
By Sue Savage-Rumbaugh, Stuart G. Shanker, Talbot J. Taylor
* Publisher: Oxford University Press, USA
* Number Of Pages: 254
* Publication Date: 1998-06-18
* ISBN-10 / ASIN: 0195109864
* ISBN-13 / EAN: 9780195109863
Product Description:
For more than 25 years, Sue Savage-Rumbaugh has been studying the cognitive skills of laboratory-reared primates. Recently, her work achieved a scientific breakthrough of stunning proportions: one subject has acquired linguistic and cognitive skills equal to those of a 2-1/2-year-old human child. Apes, Language and the Human Mind skillfully combines the exciting narrative regarding this work with incisive critical analysis of the broader linguistic, psychological, and anthropological implications. Sure to be controversial, this exciting new volume offers a radical revision of the sciences of language and mind.
Summary: Look Who's Talking
Rating: 3
Things were not going well at the Yerkes Regional Primate Center in Atlanta, Georgia. Biologist Sue Savage-Rumbaugh was attempting to train the female bonobo Matata to associate a handful of visual symbols ("lexemes") with familiar objects. But Matata was not cooperating. She just did not seem to get the point of the exercise, and furthermore she had a youngster to care for. For his part, the young bonobo Kanzi did what any child would do, alternately clinging to his mother and running wild in the room. He was constantly demanding his mother's attention, but showed little interest in the task she was struggling to learn. That is, until one day when Matata was gone and Kanzi demonstrated to the researchers that he had already mastered his mother's lessons and then some. From that point, Kanzi became the focus of Savage-Rumbaugh's research; but instead of using standard behavioral techniques, her research team taught Kanzi simply by interacting with him. Thus began the first attempt to teach language to a young bonobo in a naturalistic fashion.
Kanzi is now generally considered to be the most linguistically developed of all language-trained great apes. According to the authors, he has mastered the full complement of 256 lexemes in the artificial language Yerkish, expressly designed for ape language research. He can combine these symbols to express novel concepts, and he also uses gestures to help clarify intended meanings. But his most impressive accomplishment is that he can also understand spoken English, performing similarly to a two-and-a-half-year-old child. Kanzi cannot speak, though, because bonobos, like other great apes, lack the anatomical structures for producing speech sounds.
The book "Apes, Language and the Human Mind" consists of four chapters. The first, called "Bringing up Kanzi" and written by Savage-Rumbaugh, is an entertaining and highly readable account of how Kanzi learned to communicate with humans. Savage-Rumbaugh's approach is strongly anthropomorphic, and she attributes human-like intentions and motivations to the apes she works with. It is hard to discern to what degree this anthropomorphism is appropriate, since humans are prone to attribute intentionality to all sorts of things--cars, computers, the weather--that clearly have no mentality whatsoever. On the other hand, it is often not difficult to imagine being in Kanzi's position, as for example when Kanzi refuses to camp out in a tent with the researchers, choosing instead to return to the lab, where he can watch TV and sleep in a bed.
The second chapter, penned by Shanker, discusses the philosophical ramifications of ape language research. Anyone who is not a philosopher will find this chapter extremely tedious, but the take-home message is actually quite interesting. The view that humans are qualitatively different from all other species goes back only to Descartes, who argued that only humans (and supernatural beings such as angels and gods) have minds. Before that, the standard view was the Great Chain of Being, which saw all existence as a hierarchical structure with graded differences in mentality from mineral to plant to animal to human to divine. On that view, humans are still intellectually superior to apes, but not categorically so. Cartesian dualism is appealing to those--as for example primate researchers--who, as part of their livelihood, regularly treat apes in ways that would be considered unethical with humans. Furthermore, Cartesian dualism is likely appealing to the ordinary person because, in our modern lifestyle, we no longer interact very much with other species, and what animals we do domesticate are intentionally bred for their docility (that is, stupidity). One has to wonder, though, how many hunters, stalking their prey, view their quarry as mindless automata.
The third chapter, by Taylor, outlines the ongoing and often vitriolic debate over whether trained apes actually "have" language or not. Cases such as that of "Clever Hans," the mathematical horse, illustrate just how easy it is to unintentionally train animals to respond to subtle cues. Furthermore, humans naturally attribute mental processes to others, so it is important to test language-trained apes in an objective manner. However, skeptics of ape language research categorically reject the possibility that apes could have some linguistic ability, so there is no evidence that could ever convince them otherwise. This is a wholly unscientific stance for scientists to take. Although the null hypothesis should be that apes do not use language, the skeptic must nevertheless grant some criterion that, if observed, would be sufficiently convincing that some primates can indeed communicate intentionally with a symbolic system.
In the fourth chapter, Savage-Rumbaugh considers what the data from ape language research tells us about the nature of human language, language acquisition, and the relationship of humans to other species. If apes can learn language, this means that language is not a uniquely human instinct, as Pinker argues. But if language acquisition and processing are based on general cognitive abilities that humans share with other primates--and perhaps with many other species as well--then why do only humans have language in their natural state? Regardless of the eventual answer to that question, ethical issues are also raised by primate language research. That is, if a non-human primate truly exhibits the cognitive abilities of a two-to-three-year-old human child, does that not then imply that non-human primates deserve the same rights that we accord human children? Researchers who regularly sacrifice primates on the altar of science do not want to even acknowledge the validity of this question.
If five centuries of science have taught us anything, it is humility. We are not special. We are not at the center of the universe. Yet the scientist who accepts the heliocentric solar system, geologic time, the evolution of species and our common ancestor with the other great apes only a few million years ago nevertheless staunchly insists that humans are still special when it comes to language and cognition. Maybe, as her critics claim, Savage-Rumbaugh is over-interpreting the data. But given the trend of science toward greater humility, it is not unreasonable to think that humans are not special when it comes to language and thought either.
Summary: An excellent resource for understanding ape communication.
Rating: 4
When Sue Savage-Rumbaugh and others first began suggesting that apes (chimpanzees and bonobos) had better communication skills than language experts would credit, she and the others were soundly denounced by a scholarly community who suggested she and the others were fooled by the clever Hans phenomenon or were making up their evidence. As evidence from her research accumulated, cognition theorists, linguists, and the like continued to reject her methods and results. But eventually, the evidence that some apes have some skills comparable to human language skills became insurmountable.
This book is in three parts, written by a primatologist, philosopher, and a rhetoric and language scholar. Each takes the academic community to task at a different level. Savage-Rumbaugh presents her evidence that apes demonstrate communication (even language) skills. Stuart Shanker and Talbot Taylor examine the logic and rhetoric her arguments as compared to the arguments of her detractors, demonstrating that Savage-Rumbaugh's work is as serious and valid as that of the others', and demonstrating (at least to my satisfaction) that the arguments of her detractors are specious.
The ramifications of this book and several others like it are significant. It says a great deal about the nature of human communication and language if bonobos can use the same processes as children to come to human language.
As time passes, the value of a book may ebb. This is a 1998 book in a time when events happen quickly . . . it is for that reason, alone, that I give the book only 4 stars.
Summary: Brilliant and Original
Rating: 5
This brilliant and original book demonstrates that symbolic representation is the basic substance of language, and shows once and for all that language is not an exclusively human achievement. Savage-Rumbaugh's serendipitous discovery that the critical period for language acquisition in bonobos is in early infancy renders all earlier language experimentation with apes obsolete. Contrary to Chomsky and Pinker, grammar is a high level embellishment to language, rather than the foundation of communicative skill. The philosophical commentaries on Savage-Rumbaugh's work by Shanker and Taylor bring out the revolutionary implications of her findings, and provide a new and more sophisticated point of view on the continuities and discontinuities between ourselves and our nearest relatives. It's good to see contemporary science finally replacing the 17th century perspective of many linguists.
Summary: There's nothing 'personal' here!
Rating: 5
I wonder if the reader from Austin, Texas, read the same book as I did! I could find no trace of any personal attacks (nor personal glorifications, for that matter) in this highly original, provocative and exceptionally well-argued book. Interdisciplinary collaborations on complex themes are notoriously difficult to pull off, but this team has succeeded admirably. The philosophical analysis of the significance of the bonobo ape research for our currently dominant ways of thinking about language, communication and animal capacities is strikingly original. Certainly, these authors do not hold back from exploring the wider significance of their proposed interpretations, but there is a wealth of well-documented and rigorous argument here to support their contentions, and not a shred of evidence of -animus- against those whose views they dispute. A serious and significant book for everyone interested in animal cognition.
Summary: thought-provoking and compelling
Rating: 4
This is a rewarding book, especially in its middle two chapters. After the scene-setting of ch. 1, in which we learn just what the Bonobo ape Kanzi can do as far as communicating with a human is concerned, ch. 2 gives us a protracted survey of the Cartesian tradition of thinking about the 'mental' and hence communicative lives of animals, showing the degree to which writers like Pinker, and indeed many of us, are, largely due to an outmoded view of ourselves, caught up in a fallacy about the status of animals vis-à-vis humans which needs to be replaced with a saner outlook. In ch. 3 we are given an insight into the rhetorical strategies of those who perpetuate the Cartesian view, and shown to what extent such strategies may be motivated less by a search for truth than by the socio-politico-economic imperative of our exploitation of the animal world. The authors then proceed to show that arguments which have been used to bolster the 'existential gap' view in fact are incapable of supporting the notion that humans themselves have the exclusive and proprietary capacities which Cartesian thinkers have attributed to them. That is, (a) the evidence which such thinkers use purportedly to prove the existence of various capacities in humans is shown to be equally in evidence in at least one kind of animal, but (b) the evidence which is used purportedly to disprove these capacities in animals is shown in fact to be inadequate to prove the existence of those capacities in humans. In other words, as is further suggested in the final chapter, we have no logical or evidential basis for maintaining the Cartesian view, and the implications for our own human behavior are accordingly far-reaching. |