HOW TO STRENGTHEN WALL STREET'S GLOBAL SHARE
In
the past six months, three studies have been published on the declining role of the US in global capital markets. This decline is often blamed on the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (Sox, passed in 2002). But the US share of the global market for initial public offerings has been falling since the late 1990s. Hence this decline could not have been primarily due to Sox.Instead it resulted from a mix of factors including improvements in non-US markets and the threat of US litigation
The main factor in market selection for global IPOs is the country where the issuer has its headquarters. Of the 10 largest global IPOs in 2005, eight were headquartered in China and Europe, so they launched in the Hong Kong and European markets.
This preference for nearby markets is facilitated by Securities and Exchange Commission rule 144A, which allows foreign companies to raise capital from US institutional investors without an SEC registration. In 2006 foreign companies raised a record $10.5bn in SEC registered offerings, but $133bn from US institutions under rule 144A.
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Similarly, the US share of cross- listings of already public companies has declined from 1998 to 2006. While the premiums for US cross-listings of foreign companies were lower before 2002 than afterwards, this reduction was concentrated in issuers from countries where the local markets have substantially improved.
These markets have enhanced their technological platforms, while maintaining lower underwriting spreads and listing fees than New York. London, in particular, gives protections to minority shareholders that are stronger in certain respects than those in the US.
This is not a race to the least regulated market: no global issuers are launching from Nigeria or Burma. Global IPOs are gravitating to those markets that have the highest ratio of investor benefits to company costs.
Global executives cite litigation costs as the primary factor pushing them away from US markets. While the UK's Financial Services Authority is a vigilant regulator, it will try to resolve a problem informally before suing a company. By contrast, the SEC is widely viewed as more prone to litigate.
Some suggest that the SEC should rely more on general principles than detailed rules. But the FSA has more than 8,000 pages of detailed rules. The SEC's challenge is to decide when to regulate through informal guidance based on principles and when through rule proposals that are subject to public comment.
Global executives are also concerned about the volume and size of class action claims against publicly traded companies in the US. Although the number of new class actions fell markedly from 2005 to 2006, they were still filed against 110 companies with $294bn in damage claims. In Europe, shareholders rarely sue. As a result, premiums for directors' and officers' liability insurance in the US are six times as high as coverage in Europe.
One likely reform is the linking of class actions to SEC settlements, which often include large fines paid by corporate defendants and distributed to investors who have been harmed. These fines should reduce damages in class actions based on similar claims.
Another question, now before the Supreme Court, is what specifically must be pleaded in class actions alleging securities fraud in order to survive a motion to dismiss. (If cases survive a motion to dismiss they are usually settled to avoid costly discovery.) This is important because the pleadings in many such cases are based principally on two facts: the company announced an adverse event and then its stock price dropped sharply.
In this litigious environment, Sox is a deterrent to foreign issuers considering cross listings in the US. The key problem with Sox is its auditor-attested reviews of a company's internal controls, which have been too costly relative to their benefits. In response, US regulators have proposed revisions that would focus these reviews on controls reasonably designed to prevent materially misleading financial statements. While the definition of materiality should be more quantitative, the wording of the new rules matters less than the attitude of the government inspectors in their annual examinations of large audit firms.
In short, the rise of large global issuers in Asia, the easy access of US institutions to non-US IPOs and the enhanced attractiveness of the London markets are irreversible forces that will prevent the US from regaining its dominant position of the mid-1990s.
Nevertheless, the US can increase its relative share of global capital markets through different types of guidance from American regulators, better procedural constraints on frivolous class actions and more flexible implementation of Sox.
The writer was a member of both the Scott Committee and the US Chamber Commission on the Regulation of US Capital Markets in the 21st Century
过
去6个月内，陆续发表了三份有关美国在全球资本市场的地位不断下降的研究报告。这通常被归咎于美国2002年通过的《萨班斯-奥克斯利法》(Sarbanes-Oxley Act)。然而，美国在全球首次公开发行(IPO)市场中所占的份额，自上世纪90年代末以来一直在下降。因此，下降的主要原因可能并不在于《萨奥法》。相反，它缘于一系列因素，其中包括美国以外市场的进步，以及美国诉讼风险等。
挑选全球IPO地点的主要因素，是发行企业的总部所在国家。在2005年全球规模最大的10桩IPO中，有8家发行企业的总部在中国和欧洲，因此它们选择在香港和欧洲市场上市。
美国证券交易委员会(SEC)的144A条例，为这种对邻近市场的偏好提供了便利。该条例允许外国企业向美国机构投资者筹资时，不用在证交会进行注册。2006年，在美国证交会注册的上市发行中，外国企业总共筹得创纪录的105亿美元，而根据144A条例，从美国机构投资者处筹得1330亿美元。
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同样，1998年至2006年期间，美国在已上市企业交叉上市方面所占的比例也不断下降。尽管2002年前外国企业赴美交叉上市费用低于之后的水平，但下降的主要部分，是那些其本土市场长足进步的发行企业。
这些市场已增强了自身的技术平台，同时保持了低于纽约市场的承销价差和上市费用。特别是伦敦，它在某些方面为少数股东提供的保护措施，比美国更为有力。
这并非是在竞争谁在市场监管方面最为宽松：全球没有哪家企业在尼日利亚或缅甸进行首发。全球IPO正集中在那些投资者收益与企业成本比最高的市场。
全球高管称，诉讼成本是促使不选择在美国上市的主要因素。尽管英国金融服务局(Financial Services Authority)是一家警惕性很高的监管机构，但它在起诉一家企业前，会想办法通过非正式渠道解决问题。与此相反，外界普遍认为，美国证交会更倾向于使用诉讼手段。
一些人建议，美国证交会应该更多地倚重综合原则，而非具体规定。但英国金融服务局目前的具体规定就在8000页以上。美国证交会面临的挑战，是决定何时通过基于普遍原则的非正式指导方针进行监管，以及何时通过采纳公众言论的规则建议来实施监管。
全球高管还对在美上市公司遇到的集体诉讼案的数量和规模感到忧虑。尽管2005年至2006年期间，新增集体诉讼案件数量明显减少，但仍有110家企业面临诉讼，索赔金额高达2940亿美元。而在欧洲，股东很少提出诉讼。其结果是，美国董事和高管的责任险保费是欧洲的6倍之多。
一种可能实施的改革方案，是将集体诉讼与美国证交所进行调解结合起来，这通常包括对被告企业处以大额罚款，将其分配给受到伤害的投资者。这些罚款应该会减少基于类似索赔案的集体诉讼的赔偿金额。
目前摆在最高法院面前的另一个问题是，在涉及证券欺诈的集体诉讼中，必须做出什么特别请求，才能使诉讼经受住驳回动议（若诉讼经受住驳回动议，那么通常会达成和解，以避免代价高昂的披露程序）。这一问题之所以非常重要，是因为许多此类案件的诉讼请求主要基于两个事实：上市公司宣布不利消息，随后其股价急剧下跌。
在这种诉讼频生的环境下，《萨奥法》对意图在美交叉上市的外国上市公司构成了一种威慑。《萨奥法》的关键问题在于，要以审计机构对公司内部控制的审核为准，相对于其益处而言，这种做法的成本太高。作为回应，美国监管机构已提出了修正办法，将这些审核集中在设计合理的控制方面，以杜绝具有实质误导作用的财务报表。尽管对“实质”的定义应该更加量化一些，但新规定如何措辞，并没有政府巡视人员在对大型审计公司进行年检时的态度那么重要。
简言之，亚洲大型全球发行者的崛起，美国机构参与非美国市场IPO的便利，以及伦敦市场吸引力的增强，都是不可逆转的力量，将阻碍美国重新赢得20世纪90年代中期在资本市场的主导地位。
不过，美国可以提高自己在全球资本市场中的相对份额，办法是通过美国监管机构提供的各类指导，对轻率的集体诉讼在程序上进行更好的约束，同时在《萨奥法》的实施方面采取更为灵活的方式。 |
发表于 2007-5-14 15:53:54