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提要:尽管欧盟各成员国公民普遍关注全球化所带来的不利影响,但是到目前为止欧盟尚未受到全球化的不利影响。事实上,对货物和服务贸易全球化所带来的挑战,欧盟的应对要好于美国或者日本。不过,如果欧盟成员国不能提高自身经济的弹性,并进一步开放服务业、提高创新回报率以发挥自身优势,那么全球化就可能导致整个欧洲或者至少部分国家福利水平的大幅下降。
(外脑精华·北京)全球化正在让欧盟公民感到焦虑。最经常与全球化联系的是不可避免的就业机会流失、工资下降的压力、甚至政治独立性的丧失等。然而,到目前为止能够证明欧盟遭受全球化不利影响的证据很少。事实上,对货物和服务贸易仔细研究会发现,欧盟对全球化挑战的应对要好于美国或者日本。
然而,欧盟不应因此沾沾自喜。如果欧盟国家不能提高自身经济的灵活性,不能开放服务业、提高创新的回报率以发挥自身优势,那么全球化就可能导致整个欧洲或者至少一些国家福利水平的大幅下降。
货物贸易市场份额保持不变
首先是好消息。欧盟委员会的Karel Havik和Kieran Morrow通过研究发现,在全球化前后,欧盟15国在全球可贸易品市场上所占份额几乎没有下降,1992—1997年(全球化前)为15.5%,1998—2003年(进入全球化阶段)为15.4%。
比较来看,美国下降0.8个百分点(从12.8%到12.0%),日本下降1.9个百分点(从8.8%到6.9%)。最惊人的胜利者当然是中国,其市场份额从2.8%上升到4.4%,提高1.6个百分点。事实上,WTO最近的数据显示,中国的市场份额已经比当时又有大幅度的增长,到2004年已达到8.9%,而欧盟的数据基本维持不变。
欧盟15国之所以有这样的表现,是因为其在中高端科技(1998—2003年为全球贸易的20%)难以模仿的研究密集型产品(19.7%)以及资本密集型产品(15.6%)等领域的相对优势。在这三个领域,欧盟15国显示出强大的相对优势,不仅表现在全球出口市场份额上,在产业贸易平衡上也有所体现。
从产品层次来看,最具竞争优势的行业依次是乘用车、制药、专用设备、汽车零部件和附件以及电信设备。相对于全球贸易的增长水平,零部件领域之所以具有高增长率,显然就是全球化的结果。因为公司都开始分解传统供应链,根据不同地区供应商的相对优势进行外包。在这方面,欧盟15国的企业通过向中、东欧国家外包生产,然后内置组装线,利用了全球化的优势。汽车产业就是这个成功战略的良好典范。
服务业领域表现更好
在服务业领域,欧盟15国的表现甚至更好。2003年,欧盟15国在全球服务贸易领域的市场份额为35%,第二位的美国为25%。为了更加准确地反映相对竞争优势,通过采用与货物贸易相同的对比期间,可以发现剔除了交通和旅游业的“其他服务业”领域的贸易盈余占GDP的比重从0.2%提高到0.4%。而同期美国则稍有下降,从0.6%下降到0.5%。
事实上,与中、日两国在该领域的贸易赤字相比,存在盈余就意味着欧、美这两大经济体正在从全球化中获益。印度是服务业、特别是IT服务领域全球化的最大赢家:该领域占GDP的比重,已经从0.2%的贸易赤字增长到0.6%的贸易盈余。进一步来讲,欧洲具有比较优势的行业为金融服务、保险、IT和建筑服务,而印度的强项大多集中在“其他商业服务业领域”。
未来风险犹存
展望未来,欧盟明显存在风险。首先,尽管中国沿海地区的工资水平正在快速上涨,但其他地区丰富的廉价劳动力资源将继续让中国(现在还有越南)成为劳动密集型产业的最佳区域。其次,全球化的压力是在加强,而不是减弱。再次,从贸易平衡来看,由于欧洲在ICT行业较弱,亚洲国家在这个领域的集中出口攻势对美国和日本造成的冲击要比对欧洲严重。然而,亚洲的出口商,尤其是中国,恰恰可能会将其贸易盈余投资到欧洲最成功的行业,如乘用车行业。最后,通讯成本的大幅下降将最有可能加速服务业领域的外包。这对印度非常有利,但受益者不会仅仅是印度。
对付日益加速、并且扩大的全球化挑战没有简单办法。我们认为最有效的就是充分利用欧洲在高技术服务领域的竞争优势,并且大幅度提高技术创新的回报。这就需要服务业领域进一步自由化,并且加速欧洲金融市场的一体化,而这可能对就业产生不利影响。另外还需要在技术创新激励和融资方面深入研究,以进一步提高创新的回报率。税收政策也许会有所帮助,但是竞争政策同样需要。在这方面,欧盟委员会自身也许需要做点家庭作业。
英文原文:Europe: Coping With Globalization, So Far
Globalization is generating a lot of anxiety among EU citizens; it is most often associated with irreversible job losses, downward pressures on wages and even losses of political independence. Yet, evidence that the EU has suffered from globalization so far is scarce. In fact, a careful look at trade of good and services indicates that the European Union is coping with the challenges implied by globalization better than the US or Japan. However, this benign outcome cannot be taken for granted: if EU countries do not make their economies more flexible, miss the opportunity to capitalize on their strengths by liberalizing services and increase the return on innovation, globalization could lead to a dramatic loss of welfare in Europe, or at least in some of its countries. These are the conclusions I draw from an interesting research note by Karel Havik and Kieran Morrow (H-M) of the EU Commission (Global Trade and Outsourcing: How Well is the EU Coping with the New Challenges, Economic Papers N 259, October 2006).
First, the good news. On H-M’s findings, the EU-15 block has managed to keep its global market share in traded goods practically unchanged at 15.4% over 1998-2003 (globalization), vs. 15.5% over 1992-1997 (pre-globalization). By contrast, the US has lost 0.8 points (from 12.8% to 12.0%) and Japan 1.9 points (from 8.8% to 6.9%). The most spectacular winner is of course China, with a 1.6 points rise from 2.8% to 4.4%. In fact, more recent WTO data show that China’s market share has dramatically increased since then, to 8.9% in 2004, while the EU share was constant. The explanation of the EU-15 performance is its comparative advantage in ‘medium-high technologies’ (20% of global trade in 1998-2003), in ‘difficult to imitate research intensive goods’ (19.7%) and to a lesser extent, in capital-intensive goods (15.6%). For each of these three categories, the EU-15 has a strong revealed comparative advantage, as shown not only by its share of global exports but also by sector trade balances. At the product level, the largest comparative advantages are in that order: passenger cars, pharmaceuticals, specialized equipment goods, parts and accessories for motor vehicles and telecom equipment. The rapid growth rate of trade of 'parts and components' compared to overall global trade growth is clearly the result of globalization, as companies break supply chains and outsource the resulting bits in various locations, according to their relative comparative advantages. In this regard, EU-15 companies have managed to take advantage of globalization by outsourcing production in Central and East European countries and insourcing assembly lines. The car industry is a good example of this successful strategy.
The EU-15 performed even better in services. In 2003, the EU-15 block had 35% of the global market of traded services, followed by the US with 25%. More important to gauge revealed comparative advantages and using the same two periods as for goods, the net balance on trade in ‘other services’ (i.e. other than transportation and travel, which are growing much slower) improved from 0.2% to 0.4% of GDP, while it decreased slightly for the US, from 0.6% to 0.5%. Running surpluses, both economies are in fact benefiting from globalisation in services, in contrast with Japan and China, which are running deficits. The big winner from the globalization of services, especially IT-enabled services is of course India, which moved from a deficit of 0.2% of GDP to a surplus of 0.6%. A more detailed breakdown shows that European comparative advantages are in financial services, insurance, IT and construction services, while India's strength is mostly concentrated in 'other business services'.
Going forward, the EU performance is clearly at risk. First, even though wages are rising fast in the coastal part of China, the abundance of cheap labour in the rest of the country will continue to make China (and now Vietnam too) the best place for labour intensive industries. In other terms, the pressure of globalisation is going to intensify, not to weaken. There is more: because Europe is weak in the ICT sector, judging by its trade balance, the concentration of efforts by many Asian exporters in this sector had harmed the US and, to a lesser extent, Japan, more than Europe. However, Asian exporters and above all China are likely to invest their trade surpluses precisely in the sectors where Europe is the most successful such as passenger cars. Last, the dramatic fall of communication costs will most likely accelerate the outsourcing of services, in favour of India but not only. There is no easy way to cope with the challenges of globalisation both widening and accelerating. The best antidote remains in my view to capitalize on Europe's competitive advantages such as highly sophisticated services and to reward innovation much more than is the case today. This requires further liberalisation of services and a faster move toward the integration of financial markets in Europe, with probably negative consequences on jobs. This also requires an in-depth review of incentives to innovate and finance innovation in order to enhance the return on innovation. Tax policies may help, but competition policies too. In this regard, the EU Commission itself may have some homework to do.
来源:摩根斯坦利,作者:Eric Chaney |
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