Himma：法律实证主义（法哲学 词条 2）

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b.法律实证主义
b. Legal Positivism


与一切自然主义相对立的是法律实证主义，它大致上由三个理论命题组成:事实命题，因袭命题，分离命题。事实命题（也就是大家所熟识的“谱系命题”）断言法律效力最终是某种社会事实的功能。因袭命题强调了法律的因袭性这一本质，这一观点认为，借助于某种社会惯例，社会事实取得了权威性，而正是这些社会事实赋予法律以效力。在最普遍意义上说，分离命题只是拒绝了自然主义的重叠命题；根据分离命题，在道德观念和法律观念之间不存在重叠之处。
Opposed to all forms of naturalism is legal positivism, which is roughly constituted by three theoretical commitments: the Social Fact Thesis, the Conventionality Thesis, and the Separability Thesis. The Social Fact Thesis (which is also known as the Pedigree Thesis) asserts that it is a necessary truth that legal validity is ultimately a function of certain kinds of social facts. The Conventionality Thesis emphasizes law's conventional nature, claiming that the social facts giving rise to legal validity are authoritative in virtue of some kind of social convention. The Separability Thesis, at the most general level, simply denies naturalism's Overlap Thesis; according to the Separability Thesis, there is no conceptual overlap between the notions of law and morality.

i.因袭命题
i. The Conventionality Thesis

根据因袭命题，法律效力最终可以通过一种借助于社会惯例的权威性标准来加以解释，这乃是概念上的真理。例如，H.L.A. Hart(1996)坚信法律效力包含在承认规则之中，由这些承认规则给出创立、改变和审判的法律规则。Hart主张承认规则的权威性是籍由官员们将它作为行为的指导标准这一惯例赋予的。Joseph Raz并没有全盘接受Hart关于承认规则包含法律效力标准的见解，他认为效力标准只能存在于官员们的惯例之中。
According to the Conventionality Thesis, it is a conceptual truth about law that legal validity can ultimately be explained in terms of criteria that are authoritative in virtue of some kind of social convention. Thus, for example, H.L.A. Hart (1996) believes the criteria of legal validity are contained in a rule of recognition that sets forth rules for creating, changing, and adjudicating law. On Hart's view, the rule of recognition is authoritative in virtue of a convention among officials to regard its criteria as standards that govern their behavior as officials. While Joseph Raz does not appear to endorse Hart's view about a master rule of recognition containing the criteria of validity, he also believes the validity criteria are authoritative only in virtue of a convention among officials.

ii.事实命题
ii. The Social Fact Thesis

事实命题坚持法律效力是社会事实的一种功能。大部分观点来源于Jeremy Bentham的John Austin(1995) 主张道，法律体系的最基本特征，是一个社会中的大多数人习惯性地服从的主权者的在场，而不是在于确定的优势者。依Austin看来，当且仅当规则R出自于主权者命令且以制裁相威胁，规则R在社会S中具有法律效力（也即是“法律”）。此处授予法律以效力社会的就是在有人违法情况下将以制裁相威胁的主权者的颁布这一事实。
The Social Fact Thesis asserts that legal validity is a function of certain social facts. Borrowing heavily from Jeremy Bentham, John Austin (1995) argues that the principal distinguishing feature of a legal system is the presence of a sovereign who is habitually obeyed by most people in the society, but not in the habit of obeying any determinate human superior. On Austin's view, a rule R is legally valid (i.e., is a law) in a society S if and only if R is commanded by the sovereign in S and is backed up with the threat of a sanction. The relevant social fact that confers validity, on Austin's view, is promulgation by a sovereign willing to impose a sanction for noncompliance.

Hart对社会事实的看法却不同于Austin。Hart认为他仅仅探讨了一种规则：要求或禁止某些行为的第一性规则。Austin忽视了其他第一性规则的存在，它们授予公民创设、改变和取消他人的权利与义务。如同Hart所指出的，规制合同和遗嘱的规则很难被看作是以制裁作为威胁的对自由的限制。
Hart takes a different view of the Social Fact Thesis. Hart believes that Austin's theory accounts, at most, for one kind of rule: primary rules that require or prohibit certain kinds of behavior. On Hart's view, Austin overlooked the presence of other primary rules that confer upon citizens the power to create, modify, and extinguish rights and obligations in other persons. As Hart points out, the rules governing the creation of contracts and wills cannot plausibly be characterized as restrictions on freedom that are backed by the threat of a sanction.

Hart批评Austin最致命的错误是无视第二性元规则的存在，这种元规则将第一性规则作为它们的创制物，并且它们将完全发展的法律体系同第一性规则体系相区分。
Most importantly, however, Hart argues Austin overlooks the existence of secondary meta-rules that have as their subject matter the primary rules themselves and distinguish full-blown legal systems from primitive systems of law:


第二性规则与第一性规则处于不同的层面，它们是这些第一性规则的规则；在这个意义上说，第一性规则涉及个体必须做或不做某行为，而第二性规则却是与第一性规则本身相联系。第二性规则限定了第一性规则得到终局的确定、引入、取消、改变，它们终局地决定了规则是否被违反。
[Secondary rules] may all be said to be on a different level from the primary rules, for they are all about such rules; in the sense that while primary rules are concerned with the actions that individuals must or must not do, these secondary rules are all concerned with the primary rules themselves. They specify the way in which the primary rules may be conclusively ascertained, introduced, eliminated, varied, and the fact of their violation conclusively determined (Hart 1994, p. 92).

Hart区分了标志着法律的初级形式向充分发展的法律体系变迁的三种第二性规则：(1)承认规则“确定某个或某些特征，如果一个规则具有这些或这个特征，人们就会终局性地把这些特征当作正面指示，确认此规则是该群体的规则，由社会施加的压力加以支持”(Hart 1994, p. 92)；(2)改变规则，允许社会增加、移除和改变有效规则；还有(3)审判规则，它提供了一套判定有效的规则是否被违反的机制。依Hart之见，每一充分发展的法律体系必然包含承认规则，承认规则提供了提供了法律效力的标准，包括法律的制定、改变和审判。此处引用Hart的一句名言，法律就是“第一性和第二性规则的结合”(Hart 1994, p. 107)。
Hart distinguishes three types of secondary rules that mark the transition from primitive forms of law to full-blown legal systems: (1) the rule of recognition, which \"specif[ies] some feature or features possession of which by a suggested rule is taken as a conclusive affirmative indication that it is a rule of the group to be supported by the social pressure it exerts\" (Hart 1994, p. 92); (2) the rule of change, which enables a society to add, remove, and modify valid rules; and (3) the rule of adjudication, which provides a mechanism for determining whether a valid rule has been violated. On Hart's view, then, every society with a full-blown legal system necessarily has a rule of recognition that articulates criteria for legal validity that include provisions for making, changing and adjudicating law. Law is, to use Hart's famous phrase, \"the union of primary and secondary rules\" (Hart 1994, p. 107).


依照Hart的事实命题观，当且仅当，提议P满足社会S中有约束力的承认规则包含的效力标准时，P在社会S中才具有法律效力。我们已经知道，因袭命题主张，只有当社会S中的官员们中间存在着确定的官员行为标准的惯例时，社会S中的承认规则才具有约束力。因此，Hart认为，“确定法律效力标准的承认规则与改变规则和审判规则必须是为该社会的官员所有效接受的指导官员行为的共同的公共标准”(Hart 1994, p. 113)。
According to Hart's view of the Social Fact Thesis, then, a proposition P is legally valid in a society S if and only if it satisfies the criteria of validity contained in a rule of recognition that is binding in S. As we have seen, the Conventionality Thesis implies that a rule of recognition is binding in S only if there is a social convention among officials to treat it as defining standards of official behavior. Thus, on Hart's view, \"[the] rules of recognition specifying the criteria of legal validity and its rules of change and adjudication must be effectively accepted as common public standards of official behaviour by its officials\" (Hart 1994, p. 113).

iii.分离命题
iii. The Separability Thesis

组成法律实证主义基础的最后一个命题是分离命题。在最广泛意义上，分离命题断言法律与道德在概念上是相分离的。例如，KLAUS F蹺R（1996）将它解释为一种元层面的主张，即法律的定义必须完全独立于道德观念。也就是说，任何诉诸于道德考量的相关观念，包括法律、法律效力以及法律体系都是与分离命题不相容的。
更为普遍的是，分离命题常常被看作是关于法律效力存在条件的客体层次的主张。Hart就是这样表述的，分离命题就是“尽管实际上法律常常复制或满足道德的特定要求，但这决不是一个必然的真理这样一个简单的论点”(Hart 1994, pp. 181-82)。在客体层次范围内，分离命题拒斥法律效力必然包含着道德约束这一立场，它坚持对法律效力没有道德约束的法律体系存在的可能性。
The final thesis comprising the foundation of legal positivism is the Separability Thesis. In its most general form, the Separability Thesis asserts that law and morality are conceptually distinct. This abstract formulation can be interpreted in a number of ways. For example, Klaus F蹺R (1996) interprets it as making a meta-level claim that the definition of law must be entirely free of moral notions. This interpretation implies that any reference to moral considerations in defining the related notions of law, legal validity, and legal system is inconsistent with the Separability Thesis.

更为一般的是，分离命题常被解释为仅仅对法律效力存在条件的客体层面的要求。如同Hart所描述的，分离命题只是“一种简单的论点，就是尽管实际上常常如此，但是法律的重现或满足一定的道德要求不是必然真理”(Hart 1994, pp. 181-82)。尽管对分离命题在客体层面的解释上拒绝了法律效力倚赖于道德约束是一个必然真理，但是它还是暗示了法律效力不倚赖道德约束的法律体系的存在。
More commonly, the Separability Thesis is interpreted as making only an object-level claim about the existence conditions for legal validity. As Hart describes it, the Separability Thesis is no more than the \"simple contention that it is in no sense a necessary truth that laws reproduce or satisfy certain demands of morality, though in fact they have often done so\" (Hart 1994, pp. 181-82). Insofar as the object-level interpretation of the Separability Thesis denies it is a necessary truth that there are moral constraints on legal validity, it implies the existence of a possible legal system in which there are no moral constraints on legal validity.

尽管所有的实证主义者都认同法律效力没有道德约束的法律体系存在的可能性，他们在具有道德约束的法律体系是否存在这个问题上却出现了分歧。包容性实证主义（也被称为结合主义和柔性实证主义）认为一个社会的承认规则对法律内容设定了道德上的限制也是可能的。杰出的包容性实证主义者包括Jules Coleman与Hart，Hart坚持“承认规则可以与道德原则或实质价值相整合，一起作为法律效力的标准... 例如美国宪法中关于建立宗教的第十六修正案以及关于剥夺投票权的第十九修正案”(Hart 1994, p. 250)。
Though all positivists agree there are possible legal systems without moral constraints on legal validity, there are conflicting views on whether there are possible legal systems with such constraints. According to inclusive positivism (also known as incorporationism and soft positivism), it is possible for a society's rule of recognition to incorporate moral constraints on the content of law. Prominent inclusive positivists include Jules Coleman and Hart, who maintains that \"the rule of recognition may incorporate as criteria of legal validity conformity with moral principles or substantive values ... such as the Sixteenth or Nineteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution respecting the establishment of religion or abridgements of the right to vote\" (Hart 1994, p. 250).


与此形成鲜明对照的是排他性实证主义（也被称为刚性实证主义）否认在法律体系中可以将道德限制结合在法律效力之内。排他性实证主义者，比如Raz(1979)赞同渊源命题，依据渊源命题，法律的存有和内容总是可以通过渊源的探寻，而毋需倚赖道德论辩就得到认定。在这一观点看来，法律的渊源包括，颁布的特定条件和相关的解释性材料，比如可以加以运用的判例。
In contrast, exclusive positivism (also called hard positivism) denies that a legal system can incorporate moral constraints on legal validity. Exclusive positivists like Raz (1979) subscribe to the Source Thesis, according to which the existence and content of law can always be determined by reference to its sources without recourse to moral argument. On this view, the sources of law include both the circumstances of its promulgation and relevant interpretative materials, such as court cases involving its application.