译文对照 <法治>

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[font=楷体_GB2312]从法律之窗下载了不少外文书籍,无以为报,从中译篇文章表示谢意吧.不对之处，欢迎拍砖。
原文选自CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW  Fourth Edition by Hilaire Barnett.
这里译的是第四章《法治》。现在完成了有一半左右，约2万字。


CHAPTER 4 THE RULE OF LAW

Where laws do not rule, there is no constitution.1
INTRODUCTION
The rule of law represents one of the most challenging concepts of the
constitution. The rule of law is a concept which is capable of different
interpretations by different people, and it is this feature which renders an
understanding of the doctrine elusive. Of all constitutional concepts, the rule
of law is also the most subjective and value laden. The apparent uncertainties
in the rule of law and its variable nature should not cause concern, although,
inevitably, it will cause some insecurity. In the study of the rule of law, it is
more important to recognise and appreciate the many rich and varied
interpretations which have been given to it, and to recognise the potential of
the rule of law for ensuring limited governmental power and the protection of
individual rights, than to be able to offer an authoritative, definitive
explanation of the concept.
The rule of law may be interpreted either as a philosophy or political theory
which lays down fundamental requirements for law, or as a procedural device
by which those with power rule under the law. The essence of the rule of law
is that of the sovereignty or supremacy of law over man. The rule of law
insists that every person – irrespective of rank and status in society – be
subject to the law. For the citizen, the rule of law is both prescriptive – dictating
the conduct required by law – and protective of citizens – demanding that
government acts according to law. This central theme recurs whether the
doctrine is examined from the perspective of philosophy, or political theory,
or from the more pragmatic vantage point of the rule of law as a procedural
device. The rule of law underlies the entire constitution and, in one sense, all
constitutional law is concerned with the rule of law. The concept is of great
antiquity and continues to exercise legal and political philosophers today.
The rule of law cannot be viewed in isolation from political society. The
emphasis on the rule of law as a yardstick for measuring both the extent to
which government acts under the law and the extent to which individual
rights are recognised and protected by law, is inextricably linked with
Western democratic liberalism.2 In this respect, it is only meaningful to speak
of the rule of law in a society which exhibits the features of a democratically
elected, responsible – and responsive – government and a separation of
powers, which will result in a judiciary which is independent of government.
In liberal democracies, therefore, the concept of the rule of law implies an
acceptance that law itself represents a ‘good’; that law and its governance is a
demonstrable asset to society.
第四章
法 治
法律不占统治地位的地方,就没有法治.
       引论
法治代表着宪法最具挑战性的概念之一。法治是这样一个概念，它能被不同的人以不同的诠释，正是这个特征使得理解这个信条变得不可捉摸。在所有的宪法概念中，法治也是最主观和承载价值最多的。法治中明显的不确定性和它的可变本性不应引起关注，尽管如此，不可避免地，它会引起不安全感。在研究法治中，识别和评价它被赋予的这丰富多变的诠释，并且去认识法治在确保有限政府权力和保护个人权利的潜力，要比能够提供这个概念的权威的、明确的解释还要重要。
法治可被解释为规定法律基础要求的哲学或政治理论，或被解释为掌权者用来在法律之下统治的程序设计。法治的本质是法律的权威凌驾于人之上。法治主张每个人，不论等级和社会地位，都服从法律。对公民来说，法治既有指导性-指明法律要求的行为，也有保护性-要求政府根据法律行事。这个中心主题反复出现，不论是从哲学或者政治理论观点来检视，还是从作为程序设计的法治的更为实用有利的观点来检视，都是如此。法治是构成全部宪法的基础，从某种意义上说，所有宪法性法律都与法治有关。此概念十分古老，并且继续困扰着今天的法哲学家和政治哲学家们。
法治不能脱离于政治社会来理解。法治的重点，作为衡量政府依法行事程度和个人权利被依法确认和保护程度的标尺,是与西方民主自由主义紧密联系,密不可分的。在这方面，只有在这样一个社会谈论法治才有意义：这个社会呈现出民主选举的负责任的灵敏的政府和权力分立(其结果是司法独立于政府)的特征。故在自由民主中，法治的概念暗含了承认法律本身即代表“善”，法律及其统治是社会可论证的财富。
CONTRASTING ATTITUDES TO THE RULE OF LAW
It should not be assumed that this acceptance of law as a benevolent ruling
force is universally accepted. In differing societies, subscribing to very
different political philosophies, the insistence on the rule of law – in the
Western liberal sense – has little application. For example, from a Marxist
perspective (on which see below, pp 82–83), the law serves not to restrict
government and protect individual rights but rather to conceal the injustices
inherent in the capitalist system. Accordingly, the concept of the rule of law –
denoting some form of morality in law – represents no more than a false
idealisation of law designed to reinforce the political structure and economic
status quo in society. Echoes of this thesis dominate the more moderate
socialist conceptions of the rule of law and the critique of liberalism. It can be
argued – from the socialist perspective – that liberalism pays too little regard
to true equality between persons and too great attention to the protection of
property interests. The liberal domain thus becomes one which, again, masks
true social and economic inequality while at the same time proclaiming
equality and justice under the rule of law.3
The rule of law, as understood in liberal democracies, also has little
relevance in a totalitarian state. While it is true that such a state will be closely
regulated by law, there will not be government under the law – as adjudicated
upon by an independent judiciary – which is insisted upon under the liberal
tradition.
In traditional Oriental society, the Western preference for law is an alien
notion. By way of example, in relation to traditional Chinese society, David
and Brierley write:
For the Chinese, legislation was not the normal means of guaranteeing a
harmonious and smooth-working society. Laws, abstract in nature, could not
take into account the infinite variety of possible situations. Their strict
application was apt to affect man’s innate sense of justice. To enact laws was
therefore considered a bad policy by traditional Chinese doctrine. The very
exactitude which laws establish in social relations, and the way in which they
fix the rights and obligations of each individual, were considered evils,
according to the Chinese, not benefits. The idea of ‘rights’, an inevitable
development of the laws themselves, ran counter to the natural order. Once
Chapter 4: Constitutional and Administrative Law
74
[i]3 For a critical account of the liberal tradition, see Lustgarten, 1988.
The Rule of Law
individuals think of their ‘rights’ there is, it was thought, some form of social
illness; the only true matter of concern is one’s duty to society and one’s fellow
men.
The enactment of laws is an evil, since individuals, once familiar with them,
will conclude that they have rights and will then be inclined to assert them,
thereby abandoning the traditional rules of propriety and morality which
should be the only guides to conduct. Legal disputes become numerous, and a
trial, by reason of its very existence, is a scandalous disturbance of the natural
order which may then lead to further disturbances of the social order to the
detriment of all society. [1966, p 442; and see 3rd edn, 1985, Title III, Chapter 1
for the persistence of traditional ideas.]
In Japan, despite the nineteenth century adoption of codes based on French
and German models,4 law, in the Western sense, remained largely irrelevant
to traditional Japanese life:
Still essential for the Japanese are the rules of behaviour (giri-ninjo) for each
type of personal relation established by tradition and founded, at least in
appearance, on the feelings of affection (ninjo) uniting those in such
relationships. A person who does not observe these rules is seeking his own
interest rather than obeying the nobler part of his nature; he brings scorn upon
himself and his family. Apart from the contracts arising between important but
depersonalised business and industrial concerns, one does not attempt to have
one’s rights enforced in a court of law even though this is permitted by the
various codes … [David and Brierley, 1966, p 458; see 3rd edn, Title III,
Chapter 2.]
As the notion of the rule of law is dependent upon the political foundations of
a state, so, too, it is dependent – according to the approach adopted to the
concept – upon a nation’s economic resources. It may be that law, as a mere
regulator of individual behaviour, is perfectly feasible in an impoverished
state, and accordingly, a state which maintains law and order, and no more,
can conform to a narrow interpretation of the rule of law which insists simply
on a citizen’s unquestioning compliance with rules of the law. However, if the
rule of law implies more than mere regulation by law and is elevated to a
theory guaranteeing freedom from hunger and homelessness and entitlement
to a basic decent standard of life, then economic conditions are of paramount
importance to conformity with the rule of law. Such an approach is adopted
by the International Commission of Jurists, which in the New Delhi
Declaration of 1959 included – alongside traditional civil and political rights –
the realisation of social, economic, cultural and educational standards under
which the individual could enjoy a fuller life within the ambit of the rule of
law. On the other hand, reasoning such as this is anathema to radical
conservatives such as Friedrich von Hayek ((1944), 1994 and 1960), who
viewed the correct role of government as being best confined to establishing
75
4 Penal Code and Code of Criminal Procedure enacted in 1882; Codes on Judicial
Organisation and Civil Procedure 1890; Commercial Code 1899.
clear, fixed rules of law which ensure maximum economic freedom for
individuals, unimpeded either by planning controls or ideas of redistributive
justice. From von Hayek’s perspective, the rule of law requires no more than
the existence of a stable set of minimum rules which are to be applied in a
uniform, non-discretionary manner. A legal system is viewed as just – and in
conformity with the rule of law – if it exhibits both these features and an
absence of discretionary rules or practices.
对法治的相互对立的态度
我们不能假设法律作为善良统治力的预设被普遍接受。在不同于西方的社会里，流行非常不同的政治哲学，西方自由主义意义上的法治主张几乎没有实施。例如，从马克思主义的观点来看，法律不是用来限制政府和保护个人权利的，而是用来掩盖根植于资本主义制度的不公平的。因而，法治的概念—表明法律中某种形式的伦理性—只不过代表一种虚假的法的理想化，其实是强化社会的政治结构和经济现状。这种主题引起的共鸣主宰着较为温和的社会主义的法治的概念和对自由主义的批评。从社会主义角度来看，可以论证资本主义几乎一点也不关心人与人之间的真正平等却过于关注对财产利益的保护。这样，自由主义领域又再次掩盖社会和经济的真实不平等，与此同时宣扬法治下的平等与正义。
法治，正如自由民主所理解的那样，也与极权国家几乎没有关系。尽管这样一个国家确实用法律来严密管理，也不会有法治政体。法治政体里要由独立司法来审断，这正是自由主义传统所坚决主张的。
在传统东方社会，西方对法律的偏好是一个舶来的概念。通过与传统中国社会有关的例证，大卫和布莱利写道：
对中国人来说,立法不是保证社会和谐与顺畅运行的常规手段。法律从性质上讲是抽象的，不能考虑到不确定变化的各种各样可能的情况。法的严格施行容易影响人的与生俱来的正义感。故制律在中国传统中被视为一种恶政。根据中国传统，正是法律所建立社会关系的明确性和法律所确定每个人的权利义务关系的方式，被视为恶，而非善。“权利”观念本是法律自身不可避免的发展，与自然秩序相冲突。他们认为，一旦个人考虑到他们的“权利”，就会产生某种形式的社会疾患；唯一真正考虑的事情是个人对社会和他人的义务。
法律的制定是件坏事，因个人一旦熟悉法律，就会得出他们拥有权利的结论，接着就会试图维护其权利，因而会放弃本应作为唯一行为指南的传统的礼仪道德规范。  争讼纷起，故有审判，而审判-正是由于审判的存在-是对自然秩序的令人反感的扰乱，进而可能导致社会秩序的进一步混乱，从而有害于全社会。（1966年版，422页；并见1985年第三版第1章第三题有关传统思想的保存）
在日本，不管十九世纪采用了基于法国和德国模式的法典，西方意义上的法律仍然与日本人的传统生活大部分无关：
对日本人来说，各种类型的人际关系的行为规则仍然是最根本的，这些规则由传统设立，建立在—至少在表面上——维系那些在这种关系的爱的感情基础上。一个不守这些规则的人追求其自己的利益而非遵守其人性的高贵部分，将给他自己和他家庭带来耻辱。除了在重要的非人性化的工商业企业之间的合同以外，即便各种各样的法典允许，人们也不试图通过诉诸法院来实现自己的权利。。。（大卫和布莱利，1966年版，第458页；见第三版第二章第三题）
正如法治的理念依赖于一个国家的政治基础，它也依赖—按这个概念所采用的方法—一个国家的经济资源。可能有这种情况，即法律仅仅作为个人行为的调整器，在一个贫穷的国家里完全行得通，因而，一个仅仅维持法律和秩序的国家能够遵守狭义的“法治”，即单单主张公民毫不迟疑地服从其法律规则。然而，如果法治并非仅仅以法管理，而是上升到保证享有免于饥饿和有房可居的自由，并享有基本的体面生活的标准这样一种理论，那么，经济条件对于遵守法治就是最重要的了。这种方法为国际法学家大会采用，在1959年《新德里宣言》中，法治除了公民权利和政治权利外，还包括社会、经济、文化和教育标准的实现，在此标准下，在法治范围内个人可享受圆满的生活。另一方面，这种推理正是激进保守主义者如哈耶克（1944，1994和1960）所极力反对的。他认为政府的正确角色是建立明确固定的法律制度，为个人确保最大的经济自由，排除计划控制和重分司法的妨碍。在哈耶克看来，法治要求仅仅存在一套稳定的最低限度的规则，并以统一和无自由裁量的方式实施。法律制度如果具有这些特征并且没有自由裁量的规则和实践，就可被认为正义的，符合法治的。

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UNCERTAINTY IN THE WESTERN RULE OF LAW
An understanding and appreciation of the rule of law is both politically and
culturally dependent. Moreover, it is also clear that the rule of law has more
than one meaning, even within the Western liberal tradition. To some
theorists, the rule of law represents an aspirational philosophy; to others, no
more than a device under which compliance with law – good or bad in
content – is secured. It has been remarked that:
It would not be very difficult to show that the phrase ‘the rule of law’ has
become meaningless thanks to ideological abuse and general over-use.5
Partly as a result of such ‘over-use’, some writers have refuted the claim that
the rule of law represents anything other than a purely procedural or
formalistic device. By way of example, Raz writes that the rule of law:
... says nothing about how the law is to be made: by tyrants, democratic
majorities, or any other way. It says nothing about fundamental rights, about
equality, or justice.6
Other writers have gone further. SA de Smith and R Brazier confine
discussion of the rule of law to a few paragraphs and, having acknowledged
the past influence of Dicey’s ideas (but denied their contemporary relevance),
state that it would not be ‘justifiable to examine the general concept of the rule
of law at length in this book’.7
Contrast such a dismissive view with that expressed in the following
statement:
The rule of law is a rare and protean principle of our political tradition. Unlike
other ideals, it has withstood the ravages of constitutional time and remains a
contemporary clarion-call to political justice. Apparently transcending partisan
concern, it is embraced and venerated by virtually all shades of political
opinion. The rule of law’s central core comprises the enduring values of
regularity and restraint, embodied in the slogan of ‘a government of laws, not
… men’. [Hutchinson and Monahan, 1987, p ix]
Chapter 4: Constitutional and Administrative Law
76
5 Shklar, ‘Political theory and the rule of law’, in Hutchinson and Monahan, 1987, p 1.
6 See Raz, 1979, p 210.
7 On Dicey’s influence, see below, p 91 ff; de Smith and Brazier, 1989 (see, now, 8th edn,
1998).
The Rule of Law
In light of such divergent assessments, it must be recognised that any attempt
to align the rule of law with a broad philosophical doctrine – or indeed with
any other interpretation – is likely to meet with opposition from some
quarters. Notwithstanding such criticisms, the rule of law retains a secure
grasp on political and legal thinking: in the words of Raz (1979), it has
‘enduring importance as a central artefact in our legal and political culture’.
西方法治中的不确定性
理解与欣赏法治离不开政治和文化因素的依托(支撑)。而且，甚至在西方自由传统中，法治也不止一种含义，这也是很清楚的。对一些理论家来说,法治代表着一种有进取心的哲学;而对另一些理论家来说,法治不过是保证遵守法律(其内容或善或恶)的一种设计而已。有人已经指出：
不难看出，由于意识形态的扭曲使用和通常的过度使用，“法治”一词已变得无意义了。
部分由于这种“过度使用”，一些作者已力证法治决不代表一种纯粹的程序或形式的主张是错误的。例如，拉兹写道，法治：
…一点也不论及法律是如何制定的：是由暴君，民主的大多数人，或任何其他方式。它一点也不论及基本权利，论及平等或者正义。
其他作者走得更远。S.A.德.史密斯和R.布赖叶把法治的讨论局限于几段文字,承认戴雪观点过去的影响(但否认当前他们的重要性)，提出“在本书中详细探讨法治的一般概念不好说得过去。”
与这种轻视的观点形成对照的是下列论述：
法治是我们政治传统中一个珍贵而变化多端的原理。与其他理想不同，它经受住了立宪时期的劫掠，仍然成为政治正义的当代号角。很明显，它超越了偏见，实际上被各种政治观点所接纳和尊崇。法治的内核包含了管理与限制的持久价值，体现在“法治政府而非…人治政府”的口号中。[]
根据这些歧异的评价,我们一定可以认识到：任何企图把法治与广义的哲学信条-实际上与任何其他诠释-绑在一起的做法,都可能遭到一些方面的反对。尽管有这些批评，法治仍牢靠地掌握了法律和政治思想：用拉兹（1979）的话说，“作为我们法律和政治文化的核心制品，它有持久的重要性。”

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THE RULE OF LAW AS PHILOSOPHICAL DOCTRINE
The rule of law is an aspect of ancient and modern natural law thought.8 In
essence, the natural law tradition – of which there are many strands – insists
that the authority of law derives not from the power of any political ruler, but
from a higher source, either theological or secular. The laws of man must be
evaluated against the dictates of this ‘higher’ form of law. It is impossible to
provide more than a mere sketch of the rich history of natural law in Western
philosophy and political thought and the legacy it gives to modern
constitutions. Nevertheless, a basic understanding of its nature and evolution
is instructive, for it reveals the manner in which the requirements of good law
– morally worthwhile law – have been stipulated over centuries.
Natural law in ancient Greece and Rome
Aristotle stated in The Politics that ‘the rule of law is preferable to that of any
individual’. The appeal to law as a control over naked power has been
apparent throughout history. At a philosophical level, the natural law
tradition, whether theological or secular, instructs that the power of man is
not absolute, but is rather controlled and limited by the requirements of a
higher law. To the ancient Greeks, man was under the governance of the laws
of nature – the natural forces which controlled the universe – although this
view is more closely aligned to the ‘law of nature’ than ‘natural law’ as it came
to be understood in later times. However, from the time of Socrates, Plato
(427–347 BC) and Aristotle (384–322 BC), the quest for virtue – or goodness or
justice under the law – has been a recurrent theme. Socrates, teacher and
philosopher, was accused, tried and convicted by the grand jury of Athens for
corrupting youth with his teachings. Despite the possibility of escape, Socrates
chose to accept the verdict of death which had been imposed upon him, in
order to demonstrate his fidelity to law. When pressed by Crito to escape,
Socrates considered the questions which would be put to him by the laws and
constitution of Athens were he to succumb to the temptation to escape the
penalty of the law:
Can you deny that by this act [of escaping] which you are contemplating you
intend, so far as you have the power, to destroy us, the laws, and the whole
77
8 On natural law, see d’Entrèves, 1970; and Finnis, 1980.
state as well? Do you imagine that a city can continue to exist and not be
turned upside down, if the legal judgments which are pronounced in it have
no force but are nullified and destroyed by private persons? [Crito, in
Hamilton and Cairns, 1989, p 50b]
In submitting to death, Socrates was doing nothing other than giving
recognition to the supremacy of law: to the rule of law. An early – and famous
– formulation of the dictates of natural law was offered by Cicero (106–43 BC):
True law is right reason in agreement with nature; it is of universal application,
unchanging and everlasting; it summons to duty by its commands, and averts
from wrongdoing by its prohibitions. And it does not lay its commands or
prohibitions upon good men in vain, though neither have any effect on the
wicked. It is a sin to try to alter this law, nor is it allowable to attempt to repeal
any part of it, and it is impossible to abolish it entirely. We cannot be freed
from its obligations by Senate or People, and we need not look outside
ourselves for an expounder or interpreter of it. And there will not be different
laws at Rome and at Athens, or different laws now and in the future, but one
eternal and unchangeable law will be valid for all nations and for all times, and
there will be one master and one ruler, that is, God, over us all, for He is the
author of this law, its promulgator, and its enforcing judge. [De Republica, cited
in d’Entrèves, 1970, p 25]
It is from ancient Greek philosophy that natural law enters into Roman law.
From the Corpus Iuris Civilis (AD 534) is derived ius civilis, ius gentium and ius
naturale. Ius civilis denotes the law of the state; ius gentium the law of nations;
and ius naturale ‘a law which expresses a higher and more permanent
standard’. It is the law of nature (ius naturale) which corresponds to ‘that
which is always good and equitable’ (d’Entrèves, 1970, p 24).
作为哲学原则的法治
  法治是古代和近代自然法思想的一个方面。根本上，自然法传统—其中有许多分支—坚持认为法的权威不是来自任何政治统治者的权力，而是来自更高的渊源,或者是神学的，或者是世俗的。人定法定必是在法的这种“更高”形式的命令的背景下来评价。在西方的哲学、政治思想以及自然法留给近代宪法的遗产中，人们只能仅仅提供自然法丰富历史的一个简单的轮廓，而不可能作详尽的论述。尽管如此，对自然法的性质和演进有一个基本的理解是有教益的，因为它揭示了几个世纪以来良法-即有道德价值的法-的必要条件的表述方式。
古希腊和罗马的自然法
亚里士多德在《政治学》中主张“法治比任何个人的统治更可取”。整个历史中呼吁法律作为对赤裸裸权力的控制已显而易见。在哲学层面，不论是神学的还是世俗的自然法传统，都表明人的权力不是绝对的，而应受到更高层次的法律的要求的控制和限制。对古希腊人来说，人在自然的律法-控制宇宙的自然力--的统治之下，尽管这个观点与后世所理解的“自然法”比起来，更接近于“自然之法”。然而，从苏格拉底、柏拉图（427-347 BC）和亚里斯多德（384-322 BC）时代以来，对美德-或法律下的善良或正义-的追求已经成为一个一再出现的主题。作为教师和哲学家的苏格拉底，被雅典的大陪审团以用自己学说来腐化青年的罪名指控、审判和定罪。尽管有逃走的可能，苏格拉底仍选择了接受强加在他头上的死刑判决，以此表明他对法律的忠诚。当克里图劝说他逃走时，苏格拉底认为他面临着雅典的法律和宪法给他提出的一个问题，即他受到逃脱法律惩罚的诱惑：
  你能否认通过这次你期望的出逃行动，只要你有权，你就想破坏我们、法律和整个城邦吗？你能想象如果已宣布的法律判决没有效力而是被私人废弃和破坏，一个城市能继续存在而不被推翻吗？
苏格拉底甘愿受死，他仅仅是为了承认法律的至高无上，亦即法治。有一篇早期的著名的对自然法规则的详细论述是由西塞罗（106-43 BC）作出的：
真正的法是与自然一致的正确理性；它是普遍实施的，恒常不变的和长久永存的；它通过命令来宣示义务，通过禁令来转变恶行（错误行为，违法行为）。它不把其命令或禁令徒然加诸善人，尽管这对恶人也同样不产生什么影响。试图去改变这种法律是有罪过的，企图去废止它的任何部分是不允许的，全部废除它是不可能的。我们不能被元老院或民众免除其义务，我们也不必在我们自身之外寻找它的阐述者或解释者。并且，在罗马和雅典将不存在不同的法律，在现在和将来也不存在不同的法律，但一种永恒不变的法律对所有的国家和所有的时代都将有效，并将有一个主人、一个统治者即上帝君临我们全体之上，因为他是这种法律的制定者、颁布者、实施这种法律的裁决者。（《共和国》，引自d’Entreves，1970，第25页）
正是通过古希腊哲学，自然法进入了罗马法。从《国法大全》衍生出市民法、万民法和自然法。市民法指城邦的法律，万民法指各国的法律，自然法指“一种表示更高的更永恒的标准的法律”。它就是这种与 “总是善良与公正”（d’Entreves，1970，第24页）的特征相对应的自然法。

aimeinv

Christian natural law thought
The scriptures and gospel provided the basis for Christian natural law
thought which developed in the Middle Ages. Natural law was perceived as
God-given, communicated to man by Revelation, and remaining absolutely
binding upon man and unchanging in its content. As a result, the dictates of
natural law take precedence over man made laws. If the demands of the state
conflict with the laws of God, the obligation to God must prevail.
Undoubtedly, the most powerful writing of the Middle Ages comes from St
Thomas Aquinas (1225–74):
This rational guidance of created things on the part of God ... we can call the
Eternal Law.
But, of all others, rational creatures are subject to divine Providence in a very
special way; being themselves made participators in Providence itself, in that
they control their own actions and the actions of others. So they have a share in
the divine reason itself, deriving therefrom a natural inclination to such actions
and ends as are fitting. This participation in the Eternal Law by rational
creatures is called Natural Law. [Summa Theologica, cited in d’Entrèves, 1970,
p 43]
Chapter 4: Constitutional and Administrative Law
78
The Rule of Law
In the thirteenth century, Bracton proclaimed that ‘the King himself ought not
be subject to man but subject to God and to the law, because the law makes
him King’ (1968–77, f5 b). In 1534, Thomas More (1478–1535) – at the cost of
his life – refused to recognise Henry VIII as head of the Church, thereby
acknowledging the higher duty of obedience to God rather than the rule of his
temporal King.
基督教自然法思想
基督教自然法思想以圣经和福音书为基础，形成于中世纪。自然法被认为是上帝赋予，通过《启示录》传给人间，仍对人有绝对的约束力，并保持其内容不变。因此，自然法的指令高于人定法。如果国家的需要与上帝的法律相冲突，则对上帝的义务优先。毫无疑问，中世纪最有力的文本出自圣托马斯阿奎那（1225-74）：
上帝对于创造物的合理领导，就像宇宙的君王那样具有法律的性质。。。。这种法律我们称之为永恒法。
但是，与其他一切动物不同，理性的动物以一种非常特殊的方式受着神意的支配；他们既然支配着自己的行动和其他动物的行动，就变成神意本身的参与者。所以他们在某种程度上分享神的智慧，并由此产生一种自然的倾向以从事适当的行动和目的。这种理性动物之参与永恒法，就叫做自然法。（《神学大全》，引自d’Entreves，1970，第43页）
在十三世纪，布莱克顿宣称“国王本人不应该服从人但应服从上帝和法律，因为法律使他成为国王”。（1968-77，f5b）在1534年，托马斯莫尔（1478-1535）以其生命为代价，拒绝把亨利八世当作教主，以此表明对上帝更高的服从义务超过其世俗国王的统治。
注:托马斯阿奎那的引文的译文出自<西方法律思想史参考资料选编>