与“主流”货币政策理论商榷

gjqdzzh

作者：欧洲央行行长让-克洛德•特里谢(Jean-Claude Trichet)
2006年11月10日 星期五
  
  
与
我同为法国人的让•博丹(Jean Bodin)，对我们理解货币经济学做出的贡献，始终萦绕在我的脑海中。16世纪，贵金属从美洲流入欧洲，造成了通货膨胀。博丹从这一经验中得出结论，认为充当货币的金银流通数量与总体价格水平之间存在直接关系。货币数量理论由此诞生，并一直延续至今。

的确是这样吗？目前，欧洲央行(ECB)正主持会议，讨论货币在货币政策制定过程中的作用。目前，主流学术观点似乎认为，货币总量不应影响货币政策的决定。从这一角度来看，货币不配成为欧洲央行货币政策策略两大“支柱”之一的核心。我不赞同这种看法。在这方面，我同意弗里德里希•哈耶克(Friedrich Hayek)的观点。他在《资本纯理论》(The Pure Theory of Capital)中写道：“在讨论没有货币就不可能发生的（通货膨胀）过程的同时，假定货币不存在或不起作用是自相矛盾的。”

不要误以为我是一个货币“勒德分子”(Luddite)：我高度赞赏现代货币政策模型在理论层面的典雅与精致，尽管这些模型没有纳入货币本身。在许多方面，我完全同意它们在以下各个方面的意义：价格稳定的益处，央行可信度的至关重要性，追求可预测的明确政策的优势，以及个人通胀预期的中心地位。自我13年前被任命为法国央行(Banque de France)行长以来，这些观点就一直主宰着我对货币政策的思考。同样是这些观点，也对欧洲央行政策框架的设计产生了强烈影响。然而，我无法消除自己的怀疑：一个完全不考虑货币作用的货币政策模型，在某些重要方面是有欠完整的。

  



学术研究已开始解决其中的一些不足。通过将金融市场、信息不对称和交易成本引入基准模型之中，货币和信贷趋势在决定宏观经济结果方面被赋予了某种角色。此外，认为货币政策发展也许与资产价格变动关联的实证文献也已出现。

更重要的是，欧洲的经验（无论是在引入欧元之前还是之后）表明，在货币政策考虑和沟通过程中赋予货币一个重要角色，实际上恰恰帮助维护了现代货币政策文献所推崇的原则。在此，我仅举两例为证：我深信，赋予货币重要角色，有助于为政策讨论提供一个适当的中长期方向。对货币进行分析，并不是实现这一目标的唯一方法，但我的经验是，对货币进行全面评估实际上非常有用，货币政策的质量也因而提高。同样，根据我们自己最近的经验，当经济分析颇为复杂且结论不确定时，与货币分析进行交叉验证极其有用。欧洲央行管理委员会在2003年和2004年决定不再将利率从2%进一步下调，以及在2005年12月决定上调利率，都证明了这种交叉验证的价值。

数十年来，心理学家对国际象棋大师在与较弱选手对弈时如何获得优势进行了探索。研究人员发现，有证据表明，大师们非常依赖细致构建的庞大的战局知识储备，这种储备是他们长期累积的结果。他们的优势不一定来自先天的超凡能力，而是缘自大量实战的经验积累。

货币政策当然不是国际象棋，但我们也许能从这项研究中借鉴一些经验，以更好地了解自己的决策过程。在货币政策问题上，人们认为，经验共享和集思广益，对于正确决策至关重要——各大央行都采用集体决策方式，就说明了这一点。与此类似，基于货币分析的政策支柱，要求央行将其决策的后果放在较长的时间范围内加以考量，充分考虑过往经验和长期积累的见解，不要过于盲目地追随最新的分析方法。在欧元诞生前，货币分析是欧洲大多数成功央行的战略核心，在从本国货币过渡到欧元的过程中，帮助这些国家取得了引人瞩目的成功。这种传统不能轻易丢弃。相反，我们应该努力利用正在形成的更成熟的新技术，来增强和完善让我们昔日获得成功的那些原则。

尽管如此，我们永远欢迎大家的批评，我和我的同事们将秉持开放和坦诚的态度，与学者、各国央行人士和私人部门进行交流。学术研究的进步，将有助于我们改善对当今复杂时期货币政策的理解。

本文作者是欧洲央行行长

译者/何黎


WHY MONEY HAS A VITAL ROLE IN MONETARY POLICY MAKING

  
By JEAN-CLAUDE TRICHET
Friday, November 10, 2006
  
  
I
have always been impressed by the contribution of my compatriot, Jean Bodin, to our understanding of monetary economics. Drawing on his experience of the inflationary consequences of the influx of precious metals from the Americas into 16th-century Europe, Bodin postulated a direct relationship between the quantity of monetary gold and silver in circulation and the general price level. Thus was born the quantity theory of money, which has survived to this day.

Or has it? Over the next two days, the European Central Bank will host a conference to discuss the role of money in monetary policymaking. At present, the dominant academic view seems to be that monetary aggregates should have no part in monetary policy decisions. From this perspective, money does not deserve to be central to one of the two “pillars” of the ECB's monetary policy strategy. I do not share this view. In this I follow Friedrich Hayek, who wrote in The Pure Theory of Capital: “It is self-contradictory to discuss a process [inflation] which could not take place without money and at the same time to assume that money is absent or has no effect.”

Do not mistake me for a monetary Luddite: I have immense appreciation for the intellectual elegance and sophistication of modern monetary policy models that leave no room for money. In many respects, I fully agree with their implications regarding the benefits of price stability, the crucial importance of central bank credibility, the advantages of pursuing a clear and predictable policy and the centrality of private inflation expectations. Such considerations have governed my own thoughts on monetary policy since I was appointed governor of the Banque de France 13 years ago. These same considerations have also strongly influenced the design of the ECB's policy framework. Yet, I cannot dispel my doubts that a model of monetary policy that includes no role for money is incomplete in some important respects.

  


Academic research is starting to address some of these shortcomings. By introducing financial markets, informational asymmetries and transaction costs into the benchmark model, money and credit developments are given a role in determining macroeconomic outcomes. Moreover, empirical literature has emerged suggesting that monetary developments may be associated with asset price dynamics.

More fundamentally, the European experience – both before and after the introduction of the euro – suggests that assigning an important role to money in monetary policy deliberations and communication has, in practice, helped to serve precisely those principles that modern monetary policy literature holds dear. To take just two examples: I am convinced that an important role for money helps to give the policy discussion an appropriate medium- to longer-term orientation. Analysing money is not the only way to achieve this end, but my experience has been that, in practice, a thorough assessment of money has served well and the quality of monetary policy has benefited as a result. Equally, in our own recent experience, when the economic analysis is complex and its conclusions uncertain, cross-checks with the monetary analysis have proved extremely useful. The governing council's decision not to lower rates further than 2 per cent in 2003 and in 2004, as well as its decision to increase rates in December 2005, are testimony to the value of such cross-checks.

Over several decades, psychologists have explored how chess grandmasters obtain their advantage over lesser players. Researchers found evidence that grandmasters rely significantly on a vast store of knowledge of game positions, very carefully structured, which has been accumulated over a long period of time. Their advantage would not necessarily be due to innate superior ability, but rather the stock of knowledge built up from countless hours of practical experience.

Monetary policy is certainly not chess. But this research may offer some lessons for a better understanding of our own decision-making process. In monetary policy, the fact that the pooling of experience and diversity of points of view are deemed essential for reaching the right decision is illustrated by the use of collegial decision-making in all main central banks. Similarly, a pillar based on monetary analysis calls for central banks to consider the outcome of their decisions within a longer-term context; to take due account of past experience and insights accumulated over time; and not to follow too slavishly the latest analytical techniques. Monetary analysis was central to the strategies of the most successful European central banks before the euro and helped to achieve outstanding success in the transition from national currencies to the euro. This legacy cannot be disregarded lightly. Rather, we should strive to use the new and more sophisticated techniques that are being developed to enhance and complement the principles underlying our past successes.

That said, criticism is always welcome and my colleagues and I believe in open and candid exchanges of views between academics, central bankers and the private sector. The advances of academic research will help us improve the understanding of monetary policy in these complex times.

The writer is president of the European Central Bank