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[【财经评说】] Reputation, Trust, and Rebates: How Online Auction Markets can Improve their

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发表于 2007-8-15 19:44:39 | 显示全部楼层 |阅读模式
ABSTRACT
Reputation systems are important institutions to help sustain trust in online auction market. However, only half of buyers leave feedback after transactions, and nearly all of it is positive. In this paper, I propose a mechanism whereby sellers can provide rebates (not necessarily in a monetary form) to buyers contingent on buyers provision of reports.
Using a game theoretical model, I show how the mechanism can increase unbiased reporting. There exists a pooling equilibrium where both good and bad sellers choose the rebate option, even though their true types are revealed through feedback. The mechanism also induces bad sellers to improve the quality of the contract.
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