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来自于网络哲学百科全书，http://www.iep.utm.edu/l/law-phil.htm，这个“法哲学”词条由Kenneth Einar Himma编辑。
法律哲学
法哲学家常常与为法律和法律制度提供普遍的哲学分析联系在一起。法哲学包含了一系列问题，其中有法律和法律体系的本质这样抽象的概念性问题，同时也包括一部分规范性问题，比如法律与道德之间的关系、各种不同的法律制度的论证。法哲学中的主题往往比政治哲学和应用伦理学中的相关主题来得抽象。以美国宪法的解释是否适切这个问题为例，一方面，它属于民主理论探讨的范围，因此这是属于政治哲学的，而另一方面，对法律解释的分析却是属于法哲学的。与此类似，死刑在道德上是否可以允许这属于应用伦理学，而死刑的制度是否可以被正当化则是法哲学问题。法哲学中的主题大致上可以分为三个范畴：分析法学、规范法学和批判法学。
Philosophers of law are concerned with providing a general philosophical analysis of law and legal institutions. Issues in legal philosophy range from abstract conceptual questions about the nature of law and legal systems to normative questions about the relation between law and morality and the justification for various legal institutions. Topics in legal philosophy tend to be more abstract than related topics in political philosophy and applied ethics. For example, whereas the question of how properly to interpret the U.S. Constitution belongs to democratic theory and hence falls under the heading of political philosophy, the analysis of legal interpretation falls under the heading of legal philosophy. Likewise, whereas the question of whether capital punishment is morally permissible falls under the heading of applied ethics, the question of whether the institution of punishment can be justified falls under the heading of legal philosophy. Topics in legal philosophy fall roughly into three categories: analytic jurisprudence, normative jurisprudence, and critical theories of law.
1.分析法学
a.自然法理论
b.法律实证主义
i.因袭命题
ii.事实命题
iii.分离命题
c.Ronald Dworkin的第三种理论
2.规范法学
a.自由与正当法的限制
i.法律道德主义
ii.法律家长主义
iii.过错原则
b.遵守法律的义务
c.惩罚的正当化
3.批判法学
a.法律现实主义
b.批判法学研究
c.法与经济学
d.旁观者法学
4.深入阅读的建议
1. Analytic Jurisprudence
a. Natural Law Theory
b. Legal Positivism
i. The Conventionality Thesis
ii. The Social Fact Thesis
iii. The Separability Thesis
c. Ronald Dworkin's Third Theory
2. Normative Jurisprudence
a. Freedom and the Limits of Legitimate Law
i. Legal Moralism
ii. Legal Paternalism
iii. The Offense Principle
b. The Obligation to Obey Law
c. The Justification of Punishment
3. Critical Theories of Law
a. Legal Realism
b. Critical Legal Studies
c. Law and Economics
d. Outsider Jurisprudence
4. Suggestions for Further Reading
1.分析法学
1. Analytic Jurisprudence
传统的分析法学的主要课题乃是将法的规范体系区别于别的规范体系，比如伦理规范。Austin对这一课题进行了如下的描述，分析法学寻找“所有——我们正确称呼——的法律都具有的本质”(Austin 1995, p. 11)。因此，分析法学主要致力于提供法律存有的充分与必要的条件，在每一个可能的世界中分析法学都要严格区分法律与非法律。
The principal objective of analytic jurisprudence has traditionally been to provide an account of what distinguishes law as a system of norms from other systems of norms, such as ethical norms. As John Austin describes the project, analytic jurisprudence seeks \"the essence or nature which is common to all laws that are properly so called\" (Austin 1995, p. 11). Accordingly, analytic jurisprudence is concerned with providing necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of law that distinguishes law from non-law in every possible world.
然而分析法学的这一使命却常常被人们解释为分析法律和法律体系的概念，这些人对法哲学中概念分析的价值和特征存在一定的误解。如Brian Leiter所说（1998），法哲学已经是是为数不多的将概念分析作为主要任务的哲学学科了；哲学的其他领域已经经历了一场自然主义转向，它们吸收了自然科学的工具和方法。为了厘清法律中的概念分析，Brian Bix(1995) 区分了借助概念分析这一方法可以达到的几个目的：(1)用来分析语言用法变迁；（2）用来约定语词涵义；（3）用来解释一系列对象中的重点和关键；（4）用来建立“概念－语词”的评价标准。Bix认为法律中的概念分析主要在于后面两种。
While this task is usually interpreted as an attempt to analyze the concepts of law and legal system, there is some confusion as to both the value and character of conceptual analysis in philosophy of law. As Brian Leiter (1998) points out, philosophy of law is one of the few philosophical disciplines that takes conceptual analysis as its principal concern; most other areas in philosophy have taken a naturalistic turn, incorporating the tools and methods of the sciences. To clarify the role of conceptual analysis in law, Brian Bix (1995) distinguishes a number of different purposes that can be served by conceptual claims: (1) to track linguistic usage; (2) to stipulate meanings; (3) to explain what is important or essential about a class of objects; and (4) to establish an evaluative test for the concept-word. Bix takes conceptual analysis in law to be primarily concerned with (3) and (4).
无论如何，法律中的概念分析依然是法律理论中一个尽管充满争议，但却重要的课题。法律中的概念理论可以分为两个阵营：一群人坚持法律与道德之间存在概念上的关系，而另一群人否认这种关系。尽管如此，Ronald Dworkin的观点时常被看作是第三条道路，这一状况产生的部分原因在于人们不清楚Dworkin在这个问题上的真实立场。
In any event, conceptual analysis of law remains an important, if controversial, project in contemporary legal theory. Conceptual theories of law can be divided into two main headings: those that affirm there is a conceptual relation between law and morality and those that deny that there is such a relation. Nevertheless, Ronald Dworkin's view is often characterized as a third theory partly because it is not clear where he stands on the question of whether there is a conceptual relation between law and morality.
a.自然法理论
a. Natural Law Theory
所有形式的自然法都支持重叠命题，这一命题主张法律的概念与道德的概念之间存在必然的联系。依照这一观点，若是离开道德观念的话，法律的概念就无法清晰地加以表达。尽管看上去重叠命题非常清晰明了，但是这一命题却存在着多种解释的可能。
All forms of natural law theory subscribe to the Overlap Thesis, which asserts that there is a necessary relation between the concepts of law and morality. According to this view, then, the concept of law cannot be fully articulated without some reference to moral notions. Though the Overlap Thesis may seem unambiguous, there are a number of different ways in which it can be interpreted.
重叠命题中最强有力的那个形式为Aquinas与Blackstone的古典自然主义提供了支持。Blackstone这样表述这个命题，“这种与人类自身一样历史久远的上帝亲口宣布的自然法，理所当然地超越了其他一切义务。它对全世界都具有约束力，无论在任何国家，任何地点：人类的法律若是与之抵触则归于无效；自然法是一切人类法律强力的基础，人法的权威，不管直接还是间接，都来自于这个最初的自然法”（1979, p. 41)。在这段话中，Blackstone糅合了构筑古典自然主义理论核心的两个主张：1）不存在与自然法相冲突的法律效力标准，以及2）任何有效法律的权威和强力都来源于自然法。持这个观点，我们可以引用Augustine的话，不正义的法律更本就算不上法律。
The strongest form of the Overlap Thesis underlies the classical naturalism of Aquinas and Blackstone. As Blackstone describes the thesis, \"This law of nature, being co-eval with mankind and dictated by God himself, is of course superior in obligation to any other. It is binding over all the globe, in all countries, and at all times: no human laws are of any validity, if contrary to this; and such of them as are valid derive all their force, and all their authority, mediately or immediately, from this original\" (1979, p. 41). In this passage, Blackstone articulates the two claims that constitute the theoretical core of classical naturalism: 1) there can be no legally valid standards that conflict with the natural law; and 2) all valid laws derive what force and authority they have from the natural law. On this view, to paraphrase Augustine, an unjust law is no law at all.
与Blackstone的古典自然主义相关联的是John Finnis (1980)的新自然主义。Finnis坚信Aquinas和Blackstone的学说不该被看作是法律存在状态的概念性思考。依Finnis看来（又见Bix, 1996)，古典自然主义与法律效力的概念性思考无关；它毋宁是关乎法律的道德力量（就最广义的“义务”而言）：“自然法原则解释了实在法的义务约束力（在最充分意义上的“义务”），即使这些法律不能从原则中演绎出来”(Finnis 1980, pp. 23-24)。Finnis视野中的重叠命题主张法律的主要功能就是为国家强制提供论证。由此可知，不正义的法律在法律上是有效力的，但是它无法为国家使用强制力提供充分的论证，从而也就无法提供最充分意义上的义务；因此，不正义的法无法实现法律的概念中暗含的道德理想。在这种观点看来，不正义的法具有法律约束力，但是并非充分的法。
Related to Blackstone's classical naturalism is the neo-naturalism of John Finnis (1980). Finnis believes that the naturalism of Aquinas and Blackstone should not be construed as a conceptual account of the existence conditions for law. According to Finnis (see also Bix, 1996), the classical naturalists were not concerned with giving a conceptual account of legal validity; rather they were concerned with explaining the moral force of law: \"the principles of natural law explain the obligatory force (in the fullest sense of 'obligation') of positive laws, even when those laws cannot be deduced from those principles\" (Finnis 1980, pp. 23-24). On Finnis's view of the Overlap Thesis, the essential function of law is to provide a justification for state coercion. Accordingly, an unjust law can be legally valid, but cannot provide an adequate justification for use of the state coercive power and is hence not obligatory in the fullest sense; thus, an unjust law fails to realize the moral ideals implicit in the concept of law. An unjust law, on this view, is legally binding, but is not fully law.
Lon Fuller (1964)拒绝了法律的内容应该包含必要的道德约束这一看法。在Fuller看来，法律必然要受制于包含了八项原则的程序道德：（1）具有充分的一般性；（2）公开地发布；（3）事实上的可预期（不得溯及既往）；（4）含义明确，是可理解的；（5）规则之间互相不矛盾；（6）能够实现，不能要求人们做不到的事情；（7）相对稳定，不能频繁变动；（8）官员行动与已发布规则必须一致。
Lon Fuller (1964) rejects the idea that there are necessary moral constraints on the content of law. On Fuller's view, law is necessarily subject to a procedural morality consisting of eight principles: (P1) the rules must be expressed in general terms; (P2) the rules must be publicly promulgated; (P3) the rules must be prospective in effect; (P4) the rules must be expressed in understandable terms; (P5) the rules must be consistent with one another; (P6) the rules must not require conduct beyond the powers of the affected parties; (P7) the rules must not be changed so frequently that the subject cannot rely on them; and (P8) the rules must be administered in a manner consistent with their wording.
Fuller认为，如果达不到合法性的这几个最低原则，那么没有一个规则体系可以达到它的目的——通过规则知道行为并建立社会秩序。例如，一个不能满足第二个和第四个原则的规则体系是无法指导人们的行为的，因为人们不知道规则究竟是怎么要求的。由此，Fuller归纳说他的八个原则是“内在”于法律的，这几个原则已经包含在法律存在的环境之中了：“对这八个原则之中任何一个的违反不仅仅导致一个不好的法律体系，它将导致某种不可以继续冠之以法律体系之名的东西(1964, p. 39)。
On Fuller's view, no system of rules that fails minimally to satisfy these principles of legality can achieve law's essential purpose of achieving social order through the use of rules that guide behavior. A system of rules that fails to satisfy (P2) or (P4), for example, cannot guide behavior because people will not be able to determine what the rules require. Accordingly, Fuller concludes that his eight principles are \"internal\" to law in the sense that they are built into the existence conditions for law: \"A total failure in any one of these eight directions does not simply result in a bad system of law; it results in something that is not properly called a legal system at all\" (1964, p. 39). |
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发表于 2006-4-6 09:17:50