世界经济组织主导权向中国缓慢转移
国际先驱论坛报美国在世行、IMF和WTO三大国际经济组织中都居于主导地位，但中国成为世界第一大经济体已经不可避免。实力增强要求权力增大，国际经济组织中面临着向中国转移权力的问题。然而，中国权力的增大意味着既得利益国家权力的缩小，这个过程将相当缓慢。
经济实力全球化，要求权力全球化
美国在世界银行、国际货币基金组织和世界贸易组织三大国际经济组织中都居于主导地位，凭借的是其经济实力，或者说，凭借的是在这些组织筹建之时美国的经济实力。那么，在中国经济的生产能力超过美国之后，美国该向中国移交多大的权力呢？
从目前的情况看，中国终将成为世界第一大经济体，这个不可避免的事实证明了中国利用经济全球化的出色能力。中国经济规模达到世界第一后，虽然国民的生活水平仍然会低于美国、欧洲、日本等发达国家，但中国将有充足的理由要求，与经济实力的全球化相应，当前以美国为中心的经济权力也应进行全球化。
IMF，美国希望中国以合作换权力
去年9月，IMF将中国在该组织的表决权增加了四分之一，作为对其经济影响力提高的认可。尽管如此，中国在IMF理事会的表决权份额仍然不到4%，远低于美国接近17%的份额。而且，在负责IMF日常事务的执行董事会中，5名常任执行董事分别由美、日、德、法、英五国指派，而中国人只能参加其他执董席位的选举。
随着经济的持续增长，中国将有理由要求获得更大的表决权，但这势必会以其他国家表决权的减少为代价。而最终向中国出让表决权的很可能会是那些享有更大权力的国家，而非那些自称因表决权调整而损失权力的发展中国家。这种转变并不会自动进行，需要那些享有更大权力的国家的认可。
尽管表决权调整是IMF的定期事务，但去年美国却有意宣扬了一个事实：中国获得的表决权是美国出让的。这种做法自然有其原因：美国希望中国能够在解决国际金融失衡方面承担更大责任，换言之，希望中国允许人民币在世界市场上自由浮动。如果中国不能按照美国希望的方式进行合作，那么要获得更大发言权，恐怕要等待很长时间了。
世界银行近期难有转变，WTO阻力最大
对中国而言，在世行获得权力的难度更大。世行股份的分配虽然以IMF的表决权为基础，但世行的理事会对股权分配有最终决定权，而且只有在理事会认为世行需要增加资本时，才会增加其股份。最近，世行感到并没有这种需要，因此中国在IMF权力的增大不会立刻影响到其在世行的权力。
不过，目前中国可以在国际开发协会（IDA）发挥更大作用，IDA为世行附属机构，其业务是向最贫困的国家提供援助。按照世行的宣传，IDA是许多国家的成功之源，如韩国、土耳其等国都已经由接受IDA的被援助国转变为援助国。从理论上说，中国可以按照自己的意愿为IDA出资，这样就有可能赢得一定影响力。但2005年IDA最近一次筹资之时，中国并没有向其捐款。
相比之下，世贸组织就更难攻克，因为该组织是按照一致同意的原则运作的，所有的成员方都拥有否决权。尽管如此，美国仍然有能力支配世贸组织的运作，只是方式和IMF、世行不同。举例来说，在WTO所有成员方之中，美国发起的贸易争端最多，其他国家针对美国发起的贸易争端也是最多的。再如，在上世纪90年代的乌拉圭回合谈判以及目前正在进行的多哈回合谈判中，只有美国和欧盟两方才能参与秘密谈判。
中央权威超过美欧，中国驾驭能力恐前所未有
在中美双方较量的发展过程中，欧盟将是一个有趣的参照物。如果欧盟是一个国家，而非27个成员国组成的联盟，它将是世界第一大经济体。在IMF之中，如果欧盟在表决中统一立场，就可以控制近三分之一的表决权，接近美国表决权的两倍。
但在一般情况下，IMF的决策却是由美国主导的。在世贸组织同样如此，美国方面只有一个声音，由总统定调；而欧盟的代表却受制于成员国相互矛盾的政策目标，难有作为。
中国则不存在这些问题。与白宫相比，中国中央政府在国内面对的阻力更小，而且其贸易谈判权无需全国人民代表大会的认可。如果将来中国在国际组织的权力能够达到当今美国的程度，那么其对国际经济政策的驾驭能力将是前所未有的。近期，中国正在通过企业收购以及援助穷国的方式运用其经济权力。这或许只是中国经济权力增大的一个预兆。
英文原文：Managing Globalization: Two economic giants, how many votes?
The World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, the World Trade Organization - the United States manages to dominate all three groups and more, thanks to its economic might, or at least the economic might it had when those organizations were conceived. But how much of that power will it have to cede to China when that country outweighs U.S. productive capacity?
As of this moment, it looks inevitable that China will someday be the world's biggest economy, a status that will prove its adeptness at taking advantage of globalization. Its people will still have lower standards of living than those in the United States, Europe, Japan and several other countries, but it will be able to make a strong case for a parallel globalization of the power currently concentrated in Washington.
The process is already starting. In September, China was granted a quarter more votes in the IMF as an acknowledgment of its growing economic importance. It still lags far behind the United States, though, with less than 4 percent of votes on the IMF board of governors, compared with almost 17 percent for the United States. And among the executive directors who direct the fund's day-to-day business, the United States, Japan, Germany, France and Britain have permanent appointees; China's member must be elected, though its economy is already larger than those of France or Britain.
China will have a case for picking up more votes as its growth continues, but these may eventually have to come at the expense of the more established members, rather than of the developing countries who claimed that they would lose voting power under the new formula. Those further shifts won't happen automatically. The established members must allow the system to change.
There's no guarantee it will. Even though the readjusting of voting power in the IMF is a regular process, the United States made little secret last year of the fact that it was funneling more votes to China for a reason. Washington wanted Beijing to take more responsibility for international financial imbalances - in other words, to allow the yuan to float on world markets. If Beijing doesn't cooperate to Washington's satisfaction, additional votes could be a long time in coming.
Gaining power in the World Bank could be still more difficult for China. Shares in the bank are supposed to be distributed based on votes in the IMF. But the bank's board of governors has the final say, and it increases the volume of shares - called subscriptions - only when it feels that the bank needs more capital. It hasn't felt that way lately, so there has been no immediate effect from China's advancement at the IMF last year.
In the meantime, China could still participate more actively in one important part of the bank, the International Development Association, which offers aid to the world's poorest countries. The association is promoted as a source of success stories by the bank, with countries like South Korea and Turkey having converted themselves from recipients of aid into donors. China can, in theory, donate as much as it wants to replenish the association's funds - potentially buying some influence - yet it donated nothing to the most recent collection, in 2005.
The World Trade Organization is an even tougher nut to crack, since it works on a consensus system; each member has a veto. Still, the United States has found other ways to dominate its operation, for example by initiating more trade disputes （and being the respondent in more trade disputes） than any other member. And only the United States and the European Union participated in the backroom negotiations at both the Uruguay round of trade talks in the 1990s and the Doha round that is currently under way.
As the one-to-one rivalry between China and the United States evolves, the European Union will offer an interesting counterpoint. Were it to be a single country, rather than 27 member nations, the EU would have the biggest economy in the world. If it voted as a bloc in the IMF, it would control almost a third of all voting power, nearly twice the share of the United States.
But it is the United States that usually seems to take the lead in setting IMF policies. Similarly, in the WTO, the United States speaks with a single voice that emanates directly from the president, while the European Union delegate is pulled from all sides by the conflicting priorities of member countries, reducing his maneuverability.
China won't have these problems. Its central government brooks even less resistance than the White House, and it doesn't need the approval of a Congress to gain negotiating authority. If China obtains the power currently held by the United States, it will be able to drive international economic policy the way no nation has before. Its recent projections of economic power through corporate acquisitions and grants to poor countries may be only a sneak preview of what is to come.
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