Solum著， kid译：元伦理学
导言：假设我们正在争论一个规范法理论——比如同性恋是否应当拥有宪法上的婚姻权利，或者，是否应当用严格责任代替侵权法中的过失标准。有两个问题会在争论诸如此类的法律应当怎么样的过程中出现。这里存在着一个一阶问题,比如我们习以为常的关于原则或政策是否与某个特定法律规则冲突的问题。这些一阶问题包含了政治道德性难题；即，规范法理论包含了规范伦理学的一阶问题。然而，有时候，我们也会面对一些其他不同类型的难题。二阶问题可能包含以下这些：“法律应该是什么这一陈述的意义是什么？”或者“规范法理论的立场是否客观？”这些规范法理论的二阶问题是更为一般的的道德与伦理理论的二阶问题的的子类。这就是原伦理学的领域。“元伦理学”这个词听上去或许很玄奥，其实，在日常生活以及法律理论中，元伦理学的论辩是相当普遍的。这其中我们最熟知的例子就是规范性论辩中的道德相对主义（或类似立场）。当论辩的其中一方主张“同性恋在道德上是错误的”，另一方的回应也许是这样的，”不，它并不是错误的。而是你错了”，然而，另一种普遍的（或者是更加普遍的）回应回应是这样的，“这只是一种价值判断。”这样回答也即是表明道德判断是相对的或者主观的，甚或仅仅是情绪反应的一种表达。
元伦理学是个很大的命题，甚至可以说粗略的导言就需要一门课或者一篇专题论文，但是，某些非常基本的理念和术语可以用Blog的一个帖子加以介绍。
元伦理学问题 元伦理学包含了若干命题，而把握这一领域的一种较好的方式就是将（法律）元伦理学所包含的问题简单列举一下。
道德语言的意义是什么？“法律应当怎么样的”这个句子只是陈述了事态，还是它们还包含了别的什么？
是否存在道德事实或者道德属性？尤其是，是否存在规范性法律事实？如果是的话，那么它们是否可以被化约为非道德属性，或者它们是否以某种方式不同于非道德属性？
我们是否可以拥有关于法律应当是什么的知识（证成真实的信念）？如果我们可以，那么这些知识又何以可能？
道德立场扮演了一个怎样的推动因素？假设存在道德事实，那么难道X应当成为法律的这一事实为如何为“让X成为法律”的这一行为提供动机呢？
法律应当什么样这一陈述是客观的吗？如果不是，那么它们是否与某些社会群体的规范相联系？或者根本就是主观的？甚或毫无意义可言？
让我们一起探讨一两个上述概念。
认知主义与不可认知主义 元伦理学（从规范法理论的观点出发）最重要的论战之一就是认知主义与不可认知主义之争。一般来说，认知主义的立场是，道德陈述（诸如“是否同应有隐私的宪法权利”）表达的信念是可以是真实的或者是虚假的。（信念是“可认知”的陈述，因此冠以“认知主义”之名。）不可认知主义否定了前者，并且主张道德陈述表达了某种不可认知的的态度，比如情绪或者欲求。非认知语句（情绪、欲求）是无所谓真假的。在笔者看来，了解这一论辩最好的方法就是简要地考察一下不可认知主义其中的一个简单版本。一名不可认知主义者可能会主张，当某个人说X在道德上是错误的时候，他仅仅只是表达了不支持X的态度。也就是说，“X是错的”的意思就是“反对X”。当有人说“X在道德上是好的”，他们就是对X表达了一种赞成的态度。这种“反对－欢呼”就是不可认知主义的一种简单版本——一种认为道德语句表达了情绪的理论，而这一理论是与A.J. Ayer相联系的。如同你们所想象的那样，当代的不可认知主义拥有比Ayer的理论更为精致成熟的理论；这些当代不可认知主义的理论包括Allan Gibbard的规范表达主义和Simon Blackburn的准实在论。认知主义者主张道德命题表达了某些具有可认知内容的信念，并且是可以为真或者为假的（或者说，至少可以正确或者不正确）。认知主义的整体状况比较复杂。一部分认知主义理论坚持我们的道德信念与这个世界中的自然属性相契合；而另一些认知主义理论则认为我们的道德信念与非自然的属性相关。甚至还有一部分认知主义者坚信，道德语句可以为真或者假，但是他们又否认这些语句与事态有关（不管是自然的抑或非自然的）。
自然主义认知主义理论可以是这样：功利主义者可能相信关于行为的正确性或者错误性的语句大致上是这个世界的自然属性，比如，快乐与痛苦的自然属性：当我说行为X是对的，我的意思就是，与其他的行为过程相比，X将产生快乐多于痛苦的最佳平衡。在另一个词条（事实与价值）中，我们已经考察了G.E. Moore反对自然主义形式认知主义的“开放问题”论据。
毋庸讳言，认知主义和不可认知主义的内涵要比我们上文中所考察的这些简化的思想来得更为丰富，然而，核心的思想——认知主义和不可认知主义之间的区别——是可以接受并且相当重要的。
道德心理学 元伦理学中的另一些重要问题涉及道德判断和动机的关系。假设某人做了一个道德判断，X具有道德上的义务。我们可以顺理成章地说他是被某一动机推动着这样做的吗？或者换言之，我们是否可以认为X是道德上的要求，并且并不需要存在做X的动机？很多人认为以下这个看法是似是而非的，如果某人肯定了“X具有道德上的义务”，那么他就必须要有做X的动机。“内在主义”观点认为道德判断和动机之间存在内在的或者概念上的关联。“外在主义”则主张认为二者的关联是外在的或者偶然的。
对某些不可认知主义，道德判断和动机之间是否存在内在联系这一问题并不是那么重要。如果道德陈述仅仅是表达了动机（最简单的范例），那么我们马上可以说”语句X在道德上是义务性的“马上就会转变成“我有动机去做X”。对于其他不可认知主义来说，问题可能会变得复杂一点。然而，在大大简化了问题之后，一般而言，如果道德性与欲求与情绪非常接近并且欲求与情绪成为行为的动机，那么我们可以说道德判断与动机之间存在相当密切的关联。
对认知主义者来说，问题就没有这么简单了。我们以功利自然主义认知主义者为例进行解说。我自己知道，如果我停止目前在这个blog上所进行的工作，开始为乐施会*工作，那么我就可以得到一个更好的结果。如果内在主义是正确的话，那么这个想法就会为我提供一个停止目前blog工作的动机。假如Hume的论点正确，动机只是欲求加上信念的话，那么我应当感到某种来自乐施会工作的强烈吸引（或是其它动机上的刺激）。然而事实上，我并没有感受到这种强烈的吸引。为了让这些事实（假设它们是真实的）与认知主义相契合，有一个方法就是否认道德判断与动机之间的联系。因此，笔者的粗浅看法是，为了获得激励（动机）的力量，外在的制裁与内在的规范必须引入到道德判断中。
结论 规范法理论必然蕴含了元伦理学。大多数规范法律理论家或明示或暗示，断言他们的立场是真实的（或者至少是正确的），与此矛盾的则是虚假的（或错误的）。这也便意味着大多数规范法律理论建基于元伦理学的假设之上。当然，这并不意味着你一定要成为一名元伦理学专家才可以成为一名杰出的规范法理论家，但是，毫无疑问，如果对这一领域的状况有大致的了解必定是有所助益的！
文献
Alexander Miller, An Introduction to Contemporary Metaethics (2003). This is a sophisticated introductory text that outlines classic and contemporary positions in metaethical debates.
A.J. Ayer, On the Analysis of Moral Judgments in Freedom and Morality and Other Essays (1984).
Simon Blackburn, Essays in Quasi-Realism (1993).
Allan Gibbard, Wise Choices, Apt Feelings (1990).
G.E. Moore, Principia Ethica (1903).
*一个慈善组织，kid注
附原文如下：
Introduction Suppose that we are debating a question in normative legal theory–e.g., whether gay couples should have a constitutional right to marry or whether tort law should replace the negligence standard with strict liability. In debates about what the law ought to be, two kinds of questions can arise. There are first order questions, e.g. the conventional arguments of principle or policy for and against particular legal rules. These first order questions involve issues of political morality; that is, normative legal theory involves first-order questions of normative ethics. Sometimes, however, a different sort of issue arises. Second order questions might include the following: “What do statements about what the law should be mean?” or “Are the propositions of normative legal theory objective?” These second order questions of normative legal theory are a subclass of the more general class of second order questions of moral and ethical theory. This is the domain of metaethics.
“Metaethics” may sound rather esoteric, but, in fact, metaethical argumentation is very common, both in ordinary life and in legal theory. Perhaps the most familiar example is the use of moral relativism (or similar positions) in normative argumentation. When one party in an argument asserts something like, “Homosexuality is morally wrong,” the reply might be, “No, it isn’t. You are mistaken,” but another common (perhaps more common) reply is, “That’s just a value judgment.” The implication is that moral judgments are relative or subjective or just an expression of emotional reactions.
Metaethics is a very big topic, and even a cursory introduction is the subject of a whole course or monograph, but some very basic ideas and terminology can be introduced in a blog post. As always, the Legal Theory Lexicon is aimed at law students (especially first year law students) with an interest in legal theory.
Metaethical Questions Metaethics includes a variety of topics, and one good way to get a basic grasp on the field is to simply list some of the questions that are encompassed by (legal)metaethics:
What is the meaning of moral language? Do statements about what the law ought to be state facts or do they do something else?
Are there moral facts or moral properties? More particularly, are there normative legal facts? If so, then can they be reduced to nonmoral properties or are they somehow different from nonmoral properties?
Can we have knowledge (justified true beliefs) about what the law ought to be? If we can, how is such knowledge possible?
What is the motivational role of moral propositions? Assuming there are moral facts, does the fact that X ought to be the law in any way provide a motive for making X the law?
Are statements about what the law should be objective? If not, are they relative to the norms of some social group? Or subjective? Or meaningless?
Let’s explore one or two of these concepts.
Cognitivism and Noncognitivism One of the most important debates in metaethics (from the point of view of normative legal theory) is the debate between cognitivism and noncognitivism. Very roughly, cognitivism is the position that moral statements (such as “There ought to be a constitutional right to privacy.”) express beliefs that can be true or false. (Beliefs are “cognitive” states, hence the name “cognitivism.”) Noncognitivism denies this and asserts that moral statements express noncognitive states, such as emotions or desires. Noncognitive states (emotions, desires) cannot be true or false.
I think the best way to get a handle on this debate is to take a brief look at a very simple version of noncognitivism. A noncognitivist might assert that when some says that X is morally wrong, they are simply expressing an attitude of disapproval towards X. That is, “X is wrong” means “Boo X.” When someone says “X is morally good,” they are expressing an attitude of moral approval towards X. The Boo-Hooray theory is a crude version of emotivism–the theory that moral statements express emotions, associated with A.J. Ayer. As I’m sure you’ve already guessed, contemporary noncognitivists have theories that are more sophisticated than Ayer’s; examples of such contemporary noncognitivist theories include Allan Gibbard’s norm expressivism and Simon Blackburn’s quasi realism.
Cognitivsts assert that moral propositions express beliefs that have cognitive content and hence can be true or false (or at least correct or incorrect). The cognitivist landscape is complex. Some cognitivist theories hold that our moral beliefs track natural properties in the world; others cognitivist theories hold that our moral beliefs are about nonnatural properties: G.E. Moore had a theory like this. Still other cognitivists believe that moral statements can be true or false, but deny that they are about any states of affairs (natural or nonnatural).
A simple example of a naturalist cognitivist theory might be the following: a utilitarian might believe that statements about the rightness or wrongness of actions are about natural states of the world, e.g. the natural properties of pleasure and pain: when I say, action X is right, I mean, X will produce the greatest balance of pleasure over pain as compared the alternative courses of action. In Legal Theory Lexicon 014: Fact and Value, we explored G.E. Moore’s “open question” argument against naturalist forms of cognitivism.
It goes without saying that debates over cognitivism and noncognitivism are much richer and complex than the simplified ideas that we’ve just explored, but the core idea–the distinction between cognitivism and noncognitivism–is accessible and hugely important.
Moral Psychology Another important set of questions in metaethics concerns the relationship between moral judgments and motivation. Suppose one makes a moral judgment that X is morally obligatory. Does it follow that one is motivated to do X? Or can one believe that X is morally required with no motivation to do X? Lot’s of folks find it very plausible to think that if one affirms “X is morally obligatory,” then one has got to have a motive to do X. “Internalism” is the view that there is some internal or conceptual connection between moral judgments and motivation. “Externalism” is the view that the connection between moral judgment and motivation is external or contingent.
For some forms of noncognitivism, the question whether there is an internal connection between moral judgment and motivation isn’t much of a question. If moral statements simply express motivations (to take the easiest case), then it follows that the sentence X is morally obligatory would turn out just to mean, “I am motivated to do X.” It will get more complicated for other forms of noncognitivism, but in general and vastly oversimplified terms, if morality is about desire or emotion and if desires or emotions motivate, then moral judgments are closely connected with motivations.
But for cognitivists, things are not so easy. Let’s take our utilitarian naturalist cognitivist as an example. I know that if I stop working on my blog and start working for Oxfam, I can produce better consequences. If internalism were true, this would give me a motive to stop working on the blog. Assuming that Hume was right and motives are desires plus beliefs, at the very least, I ought to feel some sort of tug (or other motivating state) pulling in the direction of working for Oxfam. But I don’t, in fact, feel such a tug. One way to square these facts (assuming they were true) with cognitivism is to deny that there is an internal connection between moral judgments and motivations. Thus, I might think that some external sanction or internalized norm must be added to the moral judgment in order to produce motivating force.
Conclusion Normative legal theory necessarily implicates metaethics. Most normative legal theorists explicitly or implicitly assert that their positions are true (or at least correct) and that inconsistent positions are false (or incorrect). That means that most normative legal theories rest on metaethical assumptions. That doesn’t mean that you need to be an expert in metaethics to be a good normative legal theorist, but it sure helps to know the very general outlines of the terrain!
Bibliography
Alexander Miller, An Introduction to Contemporary Metaethics (2003). This is a sophisticated introductory text that outlines classic and contemporary positions in metaethical debates.
A.J. Ayer, On the Analysis of Moral Judgments in Freedom and Morality and Other Essays (1984).
Simon Blackburn, Essays in Quasi-Realism (1993).
Allan Gibbard, Wise Choices, Apt Feelings (1990).
G.E. Moore, Principia Ethica (1903). 斑竹从法律客串到伦理，而且，玩起来“元”，难得难得！ 有没有书呀？如果能把书弄来再好不过了！
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