Himma：Ronald Dworkin的第三种理论（法哲学 词条 3）
c.Ronald Dworkin的第三种理论c. Ronald Dworkin's Third Theory
Ronald Dworkin基于某些法律标准的权威性无法通过社会事实加以解释的理由而拒绝了实证主义者的事实命题主张。例如，在疑难案件中法官求诸道德原则，Dworkin坚信这些道德原则的法律权威性是无法从社会的承认规则中的合法性标准里面推导出来的 (Dworkin 1977, p. 40)。尽管如此，因为法官受相关的原则的拘束，他们必须被定性为“法律”。因而，Dworkin归纳道，“如果我们把原则当作法律的话，我们必须拒绝实证主义者的第一个信条，即一个共同体的法律可以依靠某种根本尺度的测试而与其他社会标准分离”(Dworkin 1977, p. 44)。
Ronald Dworkin rejects positivism's Social Fact Thesis on the ground that there are some legal standards the authority of which cannot be explained in terms of social facts. In deciding hard cases, for example, judges often invoke moral principles that Dworkin believes do not derive their legal authority from the social criteria of legality contained in a rule of recognition (Dworkin 1977, p. 40). Nevertheless, since judges are bound to consider such principles when relevant, they must be characterized as law. Thus, Dworkin concludes, \"if we treat principles as law we must reject the positivists' first tenet, that the law of a community is distinguished from other social standards by some test in the form of a master rule\" (Dworkin 1977, p. 44).
Dworkin认为判决是并且应当是解释性的：“法官通过解释共同体的政治结构来对疑难案件做出判决时，应当依照下面这种，或许不无特殊的，方式进行：基于这一解构的整体性，从最深刻的宪法规则与私法——比如侵权法或合同法的的细则中，尝试着寻找政治道德的原则之间的最佳证立”(Dworkin 1982, p. 165)。此处存在两个解释成功的基本要素。其一，只有当一个解释证立了该社会中的某种实践，这一解释才是成功的。这一解释必须在这种意义上符合这一社会的某种实践——它与现有的定义法律实践的材料相融贯。其二，由于某一解释为那些实践提供了一种道德上的证立，它必须达到可能达到的最好的道德观点。因此，Dworkin称法官应该努力地以大致这样地方式解释法律：
Dworkin believes adjudication is and should be interpretive: \"judges should decide hard cases by interpreting the political structure of their community in the following, perhaps special way: by trying to find the best justification they can find, in principles of political morality, for the structure as a whole, from the most profound constitutional rules and arrangements to the details of, for example, the private law of tort or contract\" (Dworkin 1982, p. 165). There are, then, two elements of a successful interpretation. First, since an interpretation is successful insofar as it justifies the particular practices of a particular society, the interpretation must fit with those practices in the sense that it coheres with existing legal materials defining the practices. Second, since an interpretation provides a moral justification for those practices, it must present them in the best possible moral light. Thus, Dworkin argues, a judge should strive to interpret a case in roughly the following way:
有思想的法官可能会为他自己设定——例如——一种任何对资料的解释都需要达到的大致的“限度”，设定这样的限度可以令该当解释在符合社会实践这个面相上是“可接受”的。继而，假设对法律中某一部分内容的多个解释全部符合这个限度，那么在这多种假设之间进行的取舍，并非基于法官在这个面相上对这些解释进行更为深入的探究和更加精确的比较，而是选择一种在“实质上”更好的解释——也就是更好地促进法官所认为正确的政治理想。(Dworkin 1982, p. 171)
A thoughtful judge might establish for himself, for example, a rough \"threshold\" of fit which any interpretation of data must meet in order to be \"acceptable\" on the dimension of fit, and then suppose that if more than one interpretation of some part of the law meets this threshold, the choice among these should be made, not through further and more precise comparisons between the two along that dimension, but by choosing the interpretation which is \"substantively\" better, that is, which better promotes the political ideals he thinks correct (Dworkin 1982, p. 171).
由此，在Dworkin眼中，拘束性原则的法律权威性来自于它们的贡献，这些贡献就是为被看成是一个整体的法律实践提供了最佳的道德证立。当且仅当满足以下两个条件时，特定法律原则就为这种道德证立作出最大的贡献：(1)这一原则与现存的法律材料相融贯；(2)这一原则要在满足原则(1)的条件下取得最大化道德上吸引力。正确的法律原则就是那些可以达到最佳道德的。
Accordingly, on Dworkin's view, the legal authority of a binding principle derives from the contribution it makes to the best moral justification for a society's legal practices considered as a whole. Thus, a legal principle maximally contributes to such a justification if and only if it satisfies two conditions: (1) the principle coheres with existing legal materials; and (2) the principle is the most morally attractive standard that satisfies (1). The correct legal principle is the one that makes the law the moral best it can be.
在之后的作品中，Dworkin拓展了他“建构主义”的视野，不仅仅探讨法律裁判，还囊括了法律理论的全部领域。Dworkin将交谈解释从艺术/创造性的解释中分离出来，并且主张解释社会实践的任务更像是艺术性解释:
In later writings, Dworkin expands the scope of his \"constructivist\" view beyond adjudication to encompass the realm of legal theory. Dworkin distinguishes conversational interpretation from artistic/creative interpretation and argues that the task of interpreting a social practice is more like artistic interpretation:
我们解释质弊钍煜さ某【熬褪墙惶浮Ｎ颐腔峤馐椭的这个发音或者记号，并且以此推测他人通过直泶锪耸裁础５?且帐踅馐驮蚴橇硪宦胧虑椋何囊张?兰医馐褪?琛⑾肪缬胪蓟???氖呛次浪?枪赜谡庑┳髌泛?濉⒅魈夂凸鄣愕慕舛痢６?颐茄芯可缁崾导?慕馐突疃?彩且岳嗨朴谝帐踅馐偷恼庵中问浇?械模赫饬街纸馐偷闹既ざ荚谟诮馐腿嗣谴丛斓哪承┒懒⒂谒?亲陨淼氖堤澹??墙馐退?窃诮惶钢斜泶锪耸裁 晕头转向啊！我的修炼修炼，就拿这篇练手来着！
页:
[1]