（法理词典—小K译博之二）Legitimacy
正当性Legitimacy
导言
Introduction
正当性，这是个法科学子经常会用到的词汇。“布什诉戈尔是个不正当的判决。”；“最高法院所默许的基本权利学说缺乏正当性。”；“对伊拉克的侵略在国际法上并没有一个正当的基础。”诸如此类的词句我们已经听过无数次了，但是它们究竟是何涵义？我们能否通过描述“正当性”这个词的涵义，而使这个概念富有意义并且与其他概念相区分开来了？“正当性”这个词语只包含一个概念，抑或是一组概念群，在这个概念群里面它们只具有家族相似性而不存在一个主导性的基础概念？
Legitimacy. It’s a word much bandied about by students of the law. “Bush v. Gore was an illegitimate decision.” “The Supreme Court’s implied fundamental rights jurisprudence lacks legitimacy.” “The invasion of Iraq does not have a legitimate basis in international law.” We’ve all heard words like these uttered countless times, but what do they mean? Can we give an account of “legitimacy” that makes that concept meaningful and distinctive? Is “legitimacy” one idea or is it several different notions, united by family resemblance rather than an underlying conceptual structure.
法理词典的这个条目将从多个角度检视“正当性”这个概念。一如既往，这个词典乃是为了初入法科门径，而又对法律理论抱有兴趣的初学者所编写。
This entry in the Legal Theory Lexicon theory will examine the concept of legitimacy from various angles. As always, the Lexicon is aimed at law students, especially first-year law students, with an interest in legal theory.
规范性正当性与社会学正当性
Normative and Sociological Legitimacy
我们的检讨从规范性正当性与社会学正当性这两者的区别开始。一方面，我们将“正当性”作为一个规范性概念来探讨。在规范意义上使用“正当性”的时候，我们从是非的角度评价某个行为或者制度，并给出一定论断。而在另一方面，“正当性”同时也是一个社会学概念。当我们在社会学意义上使用“正当性”一词的时候，我们描述正当性的信念。这两个“正当性”之间确实存在某种联系，但它们并不是同一个概念。那是因为某个制度可以在错误信念的基础上被认为是正当的。反之亦然：例如人们或许认为布什诉戈尔是不具有正当性的，然而，在事实层面上，这一判决却是正当的。
Let’s begin with the distinction between normative legitimacy and sociological legitimacy. On the one hand, we talk about legitimacy as a normative concept. When we use “legitimacy” in the normative sense, we are making assertions about some aspect of the rightness or wrongness of some action or institution. On the other hand, legitimacy is also a sociological concept. When we use legitimacy in the sociological sense, we are making assertions about legitimacy beliefs. Although these two senses of legitimacy are related to one another, they are not the same. That’s because an institution could be perceived as legitimate on the basis of false beliefs. The opposite can be true as well: for example, Bush v. Gore might have been perceived as illegitimate, when, in fact, it actually was a legitimate decision.
“正当性”的观念
Conceptions of Legitimacy
概念与观念
Concepts and Conceptions
规范性正当性与社会学正当性的区分确实相当重要，但我们并不需要单独把这个问题拿出来深入探讨。“正当性”的涵义为何？“正当性”又是如何与“正义”和“正确”区分开来的？这些问题相当深入，用一本书来回答亦不为过。但是本人在这个词典里面一贯采取中庸之道，也就是尽量避免法律理论中富有争议的结论，以提供一个中立的视角。然而，碰到“正当性”这个词，继续运用这种策略似乎有点勉为其难。因为在很大程度上，困难并非来自于对“正当性”这个词进行严格定义的争论，毋宁是正当性的不严格定义和未理论化导致了这一困难。
The distinction between normative and sociological legitimacy is important, but, by itself, it doesn’t get us very far. What does “legitimacy” mean? How is “legitimacy” different from “justice” or “correctness”? Those are deep questions—deserving of a book-length answer. My general policy in the Lexicon series is to steer a neutral course—avoiding controversial assertions about debatable matters of legal theory. But when it comes to legitimacy, it is difficult to stick to this plan. The difficulty is not so much that legitimacy is the subject of a well-defined debate; rather, the problem is that the concept of legitimacy is usually ill-defined and undertheorized.
这里给出我们下一步将要采取的策略。我们将从一开始就借用“概念/观念”的区别。我们假设有一个“正当性”的一般概念，但是这个一般概念是富有争议的——不同的理论家对于正当性存在于何处持有不同的看法。其中的一部分人认为正当性授自于民主程序；另外一些人可能认为正当性是法律授权的一项功能。下面我们就来看看关于“正当性”的四种不同观念。
So here is the strategy we will use. Let’s borrow the concept/conception distinction for a starting point. Let’s hypothesize that there is a general concept of legitimacy but that this concept is contested—different theorists have different views about what legitimacy consists in. Some theorists think that legitimacy is conferred by democratic procedures; others may think that legitimacy is a function of legal authorization. Let’s take a look at four different notions of legitimacy.
正当性的四个观念
Four Conceptions of Legitimacy
民主程序的正当性
Legitimacy as Democratic Process
正当性的民主程序是四种观念中最具影响力的。以一个简单的例子来说明。假设您属于一个较小组织的成员——比如法学院中的一个系。这个组织的管理者可以在其职权范围内做出一系列行为，但是总有一些事情是需要通过民主程序来决定的。例如，假设某个法学院院长做出一个决定，停止对所有的一年级生进行传统的案例教学法和苏格拉底谈话式教学，改采小班合作学习形式。这或许是个了不起的创新。（我并没有说这一创新一定是好的。）但是如果院长做出这决定之前并没有听取法学院教师们底意见（或是没有经过投票表决），那么这个决定一定会引起轩然大波，导致很多人的反对。而反对课程改革的理由就在于，系主任的这个决定缺乏民主正当性。
One very important and influential idea of legitimacy is connected with democratic procedures. Let’s begin with a simple example. Suppose you belong to a small-scale organization of some kind—maybe a law-school faculty. The executive of the organization can take various actions on her own authority, but there are some matters that must be decided by democratic procedures. For example, suppose the Dean of a law school decided that all first-year classes should be taught in small-groups with cooperative-learning techniques and without the traditional case method and Socratic questioning. This might be a marvelous innovation. (I’m not saying it would be.) But if the Dean made the decision without the input of the faculty (or a vote of the faculty), then it is quite likely that there would be vociferous opposition to the new organization of the curriculum on the grounds that the Dean’s decision lacked democratic legitimacy.
让我们来看一个更为熟悉的例子。众所周知，联邦大法官是终身制的，而非直接选举产生。尽管总统（提名）和参议院（认可）都是选举产生的团体，但法官们却仅仅具有间接的、不纯正的民主血统。此外，终身制往往使得他们都态度偏狭，因此，也就有了司法审查制度正当性的问题。难道最高法院大法官并非选举产生这一事实使得他们宣告政府官员——这些官员是经由选举产生的——所做出的行为无效不具有正当性？这当然是个相当大的问题。然而，我们只需了解这是个民主正当性问题即可。
Let’s take a more familiar example. Federal judges are not directly elected. They are appointed for life terms. Although the President (who nominates federal judges) and the Senate (which confirms them) are both elected bodies, the judges who sit at any given time have an indirect and diffuse democratic pedigree. Moreover, there life terms make them relatively insular. So there is a question of legitimacy about the institution of judicial review. Does the fact that Supreme Court Justices are not elected make it illegitimate for them to invalidate actions taken by elected officials? Of course, that’s a big question. For our purposes, the important point is that the question itself is one of democratic legitimacy.
合法权限的正正当性
Legitimacy as Legal Authority
正当化的另一种理解主要是关于法定权限。例如，因为杜鲁门总统是1948年民主选举产生的，所以当他在朝鲜战争期间下令占领钢铁厂时，并不存在什么民主正当性问题。然而这并不意味着他的行为是完全正当的，因为民主正当性不等同于合法。当一个官员的行为超越了合法的职权范围，有时候我们也会称其为“不正当”。当我们在这种意义上使用正当性一词的时候，我们似乎倾向于认同正当性与合法权限之间存有联系这一观念。正是基于这个原因，我们常常把未经法律授权的行为叫做“不正当”，而合法的行为则常常被认为是正当的。
Another conception of legitimate seems to focus on legal authority. For example, when President Truman ordered the seizure of the steel mills during the Korean War, there was not question but that he had been elected in 1948. But despite the fact that Truman was elected democratically, there was still a question about the legitimacy of his action. Even if his action was democratic, it may not have been legal. When an official acts outside her sphere of legal authority, we sometimes say that here decision was “illegitimate.” When we use “legitimacy” in this way, we seem to be relying on the idea that legitimacy is connected to legal authority. Actions that are not legally authorized are frequently called “illegitimate” whereas actions that are lawful are sometimes seen as legitimate for that reason.
可靠性的正当性
Legitimacy as Reliability
还有一种理论则把正当性与产生结果的程序的可靠性相联系。要厘清“可靠性观念”正当性的要点，我们就需要再次回到上文一经讨论过的问题。也就是，“正确”或者“正义”的决定与和正当的决定并非同一回事情。而这一点也确实是“正当性”一词的关键特征。我们认为：一个不正确的决定是可以正当化的，反之亦然，一个正确的决定却未必是正当的。
Yet another theory ties legitimacy to the reliability of the process that produces the decision. To see the point of the “reliability conception” of legitimacy, we need to step back for a moment. There is a difference between the “correctness” or “justice” of a decision, on the one hand, and its “legitimacy” on the other. Indeed, this seems to be a crucial feature of “legitimacy.” We think that an incorrect decision can nonetheless be legitimate, whereas a correct decision can lack legitimacy.
无疑，可靠性理论认识到了正当性与正义之间的鸿沟，尽管如此，可靠性理论却又坚持这两者之间存在着关联。它的观点如下所述：正当性要求这样的一种决定产生程序，这一程序需要满足可靠性的最低界限。因此，抛硬币永远都不会是解决法律争议的正当方法。即使本该在公正审判中获胜的一方以抛硬币的决断方式获胜，我们也同样会指责这种方式得来的结果是不正当的。
Reliability theories acknowledge this “gap” between legitimacy and justice, but insist that there is nonetheless a strong connection between the two. The idea is that legitimacy requires a decision making process that meets some threshold requirement of reliability. So tossing a coin would not be a legitimate method for deciding legal disputes. Even if the coin toss came out the right way and the party that would have won in a fair trial did win the coin toss, the decision that resulted from the flip of a coin would be criticized as illegitimate.
Randy Barnett的作品《复兴失落的宪法》就是可靠性理论的一个重要例证。Barnett主张宪法的正当性在于其产生正义结果的可靠性。正当的宪法保证了必要的正义限度。若是一种宪法无法提供这样的保证，那它就是不正当的。
One important example of a reliability theory of legitimacy is found in Randy Barnett’s book, Restoring the Lost Constitution. Barnett argues that the legitimacy of a constitution depends on its reliability in producing just outcomes. A legitimate constitution guarantees a tolerable level of justice. A constitution that does not provide such a guarantee is illegitimate—or so Barnett argues.
正当性的自由原则
The Liberal Principle of Legitimacy
让我们再来考察一个正当性理论。John Rawls发展了他称作“正当性的自由原则”的理论，这些原则是：
Let’s do one more theory of legitimacy. John Rawls’s has advanced what he called “the liberal principle of legitimacy.” Here is how Rawls states the principle:
只有当政治权力的运作与宪法相符，并且，这一宪法的实质性内容依据某些特定的原则和理念将会合理地获得全体自由且平等的公民的认同，同时，这些理念与原则是为全体公民的人类共同理性所接受的。
ur exercise of political power is fully proper only when it is exercised in accordance with a constitution the essentials of which all citizens as free and equal may reasonably be expected to endorse in the light of principles and ideals acceptable to their common human reason.”
对Rawls的这一原则的展开需要写一篇长文，但是我们这里只作三点评论：
Unpacking Rawls’s principle could take a whole article, but let me make three observations:
这一原则的独特之处就在于它倚赖于人类理性。也就是说，这一原则将正当性的基础建立在合理认同之上，“这些理念与原则是为……人类共同理性所接受的”。
The distinctive feature of the principle is that it makes reasons count. That is, the principle bases legitimacy on reasonable endorsement “in the light of principles and ideals acceptable to . . . common human reason.”
这一原则并没有要求公民事实上认同宪法的实质性内容。这一要求仅仅是宪法核心内容“将会合理地获得”公民的认同。换言之，宪法实质性内容必须以特定的方式为公共理性所证成，这种方式要求我们可以预期理性的公民将会接受宪法的实质性内容。
The principle does not require that citizens actually endorse the constitutional essentials. Rather, the requirement is that citizens “may reasonably be expected to endorse” the constitutional essentials. In other words, the constitutional essentials must be justified by public reasons in such a way that the justification is one that reasonable citizens could be expected to accept.
而认同宪法实质性内容的公民必须是自由且平等的。这就是说，这一自由原则以公民都是社会中的自由且平等的成员这一观念为前提。所谓的“理性”，也就只能为接受这种观念的公民所拥有，所有反对这一观念的社会成员将不属于“理性公民”之列。
Citizens are asked to endorse the constitutional essentials “as free and equal”. That is, the principle assumes a certain political conception of citizens as free and equal members of society. The reasons are addressed to citizens conceived in this way, and not to citizens as they are, if that includes their rejection of the notion that each and every citizen should be regarded as a free and equal member of society.
Rawls关于“正当性”的自由原则把我们引到了作为一整个家族系列的“正当性”观念。Rawls的原则是与他的“公共理性”紧密相连的，但是我们可以想见其他一些理论或许会包含某些理性在“正当性”之内或是将某个范畴的理性排除在“正当性”之外。
Rawls’s liberal principle of legitimacy point us in the direction of a whole family of ideas about legitimacy. Rawls’s principle is tied to his idea of public reason, but we can imagine other theories of legitimacy that include particular kinds of reasons as legitimating or exclude categories of reasons as illegitimate.
竞合性观念还是互补性观念
Competing versus Complementary Conceptions
当我们探讨正当性的诸多概念之始，我们就假设存在“正当性”的诸多“竞合性观念”，也就是说，在一个给定的运用这一概念的语境之内只有一个适切的正当性概念。现在让我们进一步检视这个假设。
We began our investigation of various conceptions of legitimacy with the working hypothesis that these would be “competing conceptions,” i.e., that only one of these theories of legitimacy could be correct for a given domain of application. Now, let’s take a second look at that assumption.
多种“正当性”观念之间相互竞争这个假设真的符合事实吗？是不是存在另一种可能，就是一部分（或者全部）正当性的观念之间存在互补性。比如，我们会说具有合法职权的官员作出的某个决定具有正当性，但是这同一个决定由于是未经选举产生的法官作出的——与民主选举的立法者形成鲜明对比，而最终缺乏民主正当性。如果这种谈论方式是有意义的，那么或许这种种正当性观念之间不是相互竞合的，它们之间存在着一种互补关系。
Is it really the case that the various conceptions of legitimacy compete with one another? There is another possibility—that some (or all) of these conceptions are complementary. For example, we might say that a given judicial decision has legitimacy in the sense that it was made by legally authorized officials, but that the same decision lacks democratic legitimacy, because it was made by unelected judges contrary to the will of democratically elected legislators. If this way of talking is sensible, then it may be the case that the various conceptions of legitimacy do not compete with one another, but rather exist in some sort of complementary relationship.
结论
Conclusion
我们的在这里的讨论相当肤浅，但是我还是希望这个条目为你们思考“正当性”问题提供一定的帮助。我的个人意见是当我们使用正当性这个概念的时候应当加倍小心。因为“正当性”这个概念拥有多个面相，且远未达到高度理论化要求，所以我们一不小心就会使这个概念变得模糊不清，或是论证得不够充分。
We’ve barely scratched the surface, but I hope this entry has given you food for thought about the idea of “legitimacy.” My own sense is that one should be very wary about deploying the idea of legitimacy. Because legitimacy has different senses and is undertheorized, it is very easy to make claims about legitimacy that are ambiguous or theoretically unsound.
kid按：其实一直以来都把正当性作为合法性的对立面，也就是说前者具有超越性，超越实在法的规定，是一个批判性概念。而这个传统可以在哈贝马斯的《实是与规范之间》找到，但是从这个条目来看，正当性的外延似乎与合法性存在重合，这里所谓合法的正当性，其实就是指合法性。 附Daniel Brudney的《考察自由的正当性》一文
作为对这个条目论罗尔斯正当性自由原则的一个补充！ 顶 好东西 怎样才哟５０个点
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